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Articles
THE FIVE WORST (AND FIVE BEST) AMERICAN
CRIMINAL CODES
Paul H. Robinson, Michael T Cahill, and Usman Mohammad"
Each American jurisdiction has a criminal code. Most jurisdictions
have substantially restructured and improved their codes since 1962, when
the American Law Institute first promulgated its Model Penal Code.' Such
reform efforts are worthwhile, especially in criminal law, because many ad-
vantages flow from the thoughtful codification of criminal law rules. By
compiling all criminal rules in a single comprehensive source, codification
makes access to these rules easier, increasing the chance that citizens will
know what the criminal law commands. A codified rule has the advantage
of increased precision, which is likely to increase the uniformity of its ap-
plication. Uncodified rules-or, even worse, unenacted rules, such as
common-law offenses-often suffer from vagueness and ambiguity, which
increase the potential for bias, abuse, and arbitrariness in their application.
The articulation of criminal law rules in an integrated code also makes it
easier to detect internal inconsistencies and irrationalities among the rules
because clear and unified legislative expression makes the specific demands
and effects of each rule, and the relationship among the rules, apparent in a
way that expression through judicial opinions or uncoordinated legislation
cannot. Finally, requiring statutory enactment of criminal rules assures that
the criminalization authority remains the province of the legislature, as is
desirable in a democratic society. The absence of a statutory provision to
control a significant component of the criminal law amounts to a de facto
delegation of criminalization power to the courts.
Crime and criminal justice are among the few perennially "hot" politi-
cal issues to which legislatures are sure to pay frequent and close attention.
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But the virtues of codification are not always, or even usually, central to
legislatures when they address these issues. No politician runs for office on
a platform to "increase internal consistency within the criminal law."
2
Thus, while criminal law attracts much legislative attention, criminal codes
attract little. As a result, the advantages of codification commonly are re-
alized only imperfectly in American codes.
Indeed, many American criminal codes are not true codes at all, in the
modem sense of cohesive, well-structured, and self-contained statutory
schemes. Rather, they are mere collections of statutory provisions similar
to the generalized legislative "codes" of the last century and before. In
many instances, even states that adopted modem, systematic criminal
codes-typically during the recodification wave of the 1960s and 1970s-
have since altered their codes through ad hoc amendment, making them dra-
matically less systematic and internally consistent. Often, the deterioration
of a code results simply from ignorance of the structure and operation that
the code's original drafters intended. In other cases, the deterioration is the
product of politics, as interest groups of one sort or another arrange special
provisions of one kind or another.
Politicians bear few costs from enacting or developing poorly organized
and drafted criminal codes because the social costs of having such a code,
even if substantial, are hidden and diffuse: uncertainty and confusion in
prosecutions and the lack of predictability and uniformity in adjudicative out-
comes. The voting public would see these problems only if it understood the
inner workings of the criminal justice system in a way that typically only
judges, lawyers, and other frequent participants do. And these professional
participants often are not sufficiently dissatisfied with their current situation
to demand reform unless it is apparent to them that a better system is avail-
able. Moreover, these participants may have an investment in keeping the
system as it is because, while it has its problems, at least its problems are
known. Sometimes simple inertia keeps a bad code in place. Criminal code
reformers often hear judges, lawyers, and police officers complain that they
do not want to have to learn new rules, or even new code section numbers.
With little apparent cost to having a deficient criminal code and clear costs to
undertaking a reform of it, legislatures are likely to pass up the virtues of re-
codification to keep the certainty and familiarity of the status quo.
Our hope in undertaking the project that resulted in this Article was to
highlight the serious deficiencies (and strengths) of American criminal
codes, and thereby to provide an incentive for reform. This Article devel-
ops a conceptual framework with which to evaluate the effectiveness of a
criminal code, translates that framework into a quantitative scoring system,
2 To do so would be something like selling a "fundamentals of wrestling" course at a World Cham-
pionship Wrestling convention-in some trades, even the "professionals" show little devotion to crafts-
manship.
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and uses the scoring system to rank the performance of all fifty-two Ameri-
can criminal codes.
Part I of the Article describes in general terms the functions criminal
codes are meant to perform. Reasoning from these functions, Part II ad-
vances five general criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of a criminal
code. Each of these five general criteria is dissected into a list of specific
factors to guide assessment of a code. In Part III, we describe the scoring
system we developed to apply the Part II criteria to each of the fifty-two
criminal codes in the United States. Part IV reports the results of our
evaluations. We provide a ranked list of the codes for each criterion and for
overall performance and offer illustrations of the best and worst exemplars
of the factors we used to calculate our scores. In its conclusion, the Article
discusses the rankings and their implications.
I. THE FUNCTIONS OF A CRIMINAL CODE
The criminal law has two primary functions.4 First, it has a ride ar-
ticulation function: it must define and announce the conduct that is prohib-
ited (or required) by the criminal law. Such "rules of conduct," as they
have been called, provide ex ante direction to members of the community as
to the conduct that must be avoided (or that must be performed) upon pain
of criminal sanction.
It seems only reasonable that society tell its members in an understand-
able form what the criminal law expects of them. Indeed, our condemna-
tion and punishment of criminals, as distinguished from civil violators, rests
upon the assumption that a criminal violation requires some consciousness
of wrongdoing, or at least a gross deviation from a clearly defined standard
of lawful conduct. How can this assumption be sustained if the commands
of the criminal law are unclear? How can we condemn and punish viola-
tions of the rules of lawful conduct if the general public does not, and can-
not reasonably be expected to, know those rules? One also may wonder
how effective the criminal law can be in deterring criminal conduct if the
law's prohibitions are unclear. The criminal law thus has a great interest in
effectively communicating its rules of conduct.
When a violation of the rules of conduct occurs, the criminal law takes
on a different role, an adjudication function.5 The adjudication function has
two components: the code must decide whether the violation merits crimi-
nal liability and, if so, how much. Thus the first adjudication issue, setting
the minimum conditions for liability, assesses ex post whether the violation
3 The United States, each of the fifty states individually, and the District of Columbia all have
criminal codes, for a total of fifty-two.
4 For a discussion of the functions, see PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND Fmcno: mt
CRIMiNAL LAW 125, 138-42 (1997).
5 For a general discussion of the distinction between rules of conduct and principles of adjudication,
see Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles ofAdjudication, 57 U. CI. L REV. 729 (1990).
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is sufficiently blameworthy "to warrant the condemnation of conviction.,
'6
Where it has established that criminal liability is to be imposed, criminal
law must address the residual adjudication issue of grading, assessing the
general range of punishment that ought to be imposed. The degree of pun-
ishment is usually meant to reflect the moral blameworthiness of the of-
fender. While the first step in the adjudication process (the liability
function) involves a binary yes-or-no decision as to whether the minimum
conditions for liability are satisfied, the latter step (the grading function) re-
quires judgments of degree. It must consider such factors as the relative
harmfulness of the violation and the level of culpability of the actor.
In performing these different functions, a criminal code addresses dif-
ferent audiences. In serving the first function, announcing the rules of con-
duct, the code addresses the members of the public. In performing the two
aspects of the second, adjudicative function-determining whether to im-
pose liability and, if so, at what grade of liability and punishment-the code
addresses lawyers, judges, jurors, and others who participate in the adjudi-
cation process.
Because of these different audiences, the different functions often call
for different drafting styles. To communicate the rules of conduct effectively
to the public, the code must be easy to read and understand. It must give a
clear statement, in objective terms if possible, of the conduct that the law
prohibits and under what conditions it is prohibited. Readability, accessibil-
ity, simplicity, and clarity are the useful characteristics in this function.
The adjudicators, on the other hand, can tolerate greater complexity.
Moreover, although clarity and simplicity are always virtues, the subtle and
sophisticated judgments required of adjudicators necessarily limit the extent
to which adjudication rules can be simple yet useful. While the public can
be told rather easily and clearly that "[y]ou may not cause bodily injury or
death to another person,"7 when a prohibited injurious act does occur, the
adjudicators need numerous and intricate rules to determine whether the
injurer ought to escape liability because, for instance, he or she had no cul-
pability, was insane, or mistakenly but reasonably believed that the force
used was necessary for self-defense. If liability is appropriate, the grading
rules must determine the degree of liability that is appropriate, taking ac-
count of the level of the actor's culpability, the extent of the injury, and a va-
riety of other mitigating and aggravating circumstances. To perform these
functions properly, many, if not most, of the liability and grading rules must
use complex and sometimes subjective criteria.
6 This is a Model Penal Code phrase. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12(2) (1962).
7 ROBINSON, supra note 4, app. A, § 3 (Injury to a Person).
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HI. AN EVALUATION SYSTEM
Given the advantages of codifying criminal law (increasing fair notice
of the law's commands, increasing uniformity in application, decreasing the
potential for abuse of discretion, and reserving the criminalization authority
to the legislature) and given the special demands on a criminal code in per-
forming its various functions (articulating rules of conduct and principles
for adjudication of liability and grading a violation), how can one construct
a system to evaluate the effectiveness of a criminal code?
It is important at the outset to be clear about what such an evaluation
should not do. An assessment of a criminal code-as opposed to the crimi-
nal laws contained therein-should address the integrit
, 
of the code as a
scheme for articulating legal rules, but not, for the most part, the wisdom of
the rules the code articulates! In developing our evaluation scheme, there-
fore, we attempted to minimize the effect of our own value judgments about
what should and should not be criminalized. We think this is a matter for
individual legislatures to resolve. Our focus is primarily on judging how
well the legislature's criminalization decisions have been thought out, for-
mulated, and communicated. To avoid substituting our own value judg-
ments, we were critical of the substance of codes only in those situations in
which a code diverged from widely shared intuitions of justice that were
dramatic and generally uncontested-that is, instances where the disparity
seems inadvertent (the drafters themselves probably did not intend the
rule's result) or where the injustice of the rule is acknowledged but justified
on some other ground (for example, the drafters claim that a less unjust rule
cannot be drafted or would entail undesirable practical problems that other
jurisdictions have shown can be overcome).9
We developed two criteria by which to evaluate a code's effectiveness
in announcing the rules of conduct. First, the code must be comprehensive
in describing the rules of conduct. Second, it must communicate those rules
effectively to the general public. Fuller explanations of these two criteria,
and of the factors we used to judge a code's satisfaction of these criteria,
appear in subparts I.A and II.B of this Article, respectively.
We also formulated three criteria by which to judge a code's adjudica-
tion rules. First, the rules for both liability and grading must be comprehen-
sive and accessible. Second, the liability rules should capture the
community's sense of justice. Phrased negatively, the question here is:
8 As will become clear later, however, sometimes substantive decisions directly affect the efficacy
of the code's communicative or structural power-as, for example, when the legislature drafts numzrous
specific, trivial offenses that undermine the code's authority and clarity. Sea generally Infra Part IV.
9 For any number of reasons, the systematic injustices from code provisions on which we focus may
not actually occur. For example. prosecutors or judges may refuse to apply the code as witten, orjuries
may refuse to follow jury instructions derived from the code's rule. But a criminal code has failed, and
deserves criticism, when injustice or failures ofjustice are avoided only because of decision makers' ex-
ercise of discretion, especially where avoiding injustice requires the decision maker to refuse to follow
the law as written.
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would application of the code's adjudication rules regularly result in crimi-
nal liability for persons that the community would agree do not deserve it?
Third, the code must establish accurate and consistent rules for determining
the grade of a violation. In other words, application of the code's grading
provisions should not regularly impose an amount of punishment that the
community would perceive as unjust (either too much or too little). These
three criteria, and the factors relevant to their evaluation, are elaborated and
defended more thoroughly in subparts II.C, EI.D, and II.E.10
A. Does the Code Contain a Comprehensive Statement of the Law's
Commands?
A code must tell persons what conduct it prohibits, what conduct it re-
quires, and what conduct normally prohibited is permitted-justified-un-
der special conditions. Obviously, a code cannot inform citizens of the
law's commands if it does not include all of them-in other words, if it fails
to codify some offenses and justification defenses. Codifying an offense or
justification defense but leaving important terms undefined can have a similar
effect. Failure to include or fully explain the nature of a criminal offense, an
affirmative duty, or a justification rule essentially leaves the criminalization
decision to the courts and makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a layper-
son to know the rules of conduct. An elaboration of the factors we used to
judge the comprehensiveness of criminal codes follows."
1. Abolition of Uncodified or Common-Law Offenses. A code that is
not self-contained, but admits of the possibility of criminal punishment for
uncodified offenses, cannot provide proper notice or assure consistent en-
forcement. Uncodified offenses may be generated in two ways: the legis-
lature may set out additional crimes that appear in statutes other than the
criminal code, or the courts may define "common-law crimes." A code that
fails to foreclose both of these possibilities by way of an explicit prohibition
will have at least three shortcomings.
First, and most obviously, the likelihood of notice to the populace at
large diminishes as the dispersion of criminal provisions in the state's
statutory scheme increases. It is simply much easier for the layperson to
educate herself about the state's criminal law if that law can be found in one
place. In fact, a state that codifies some, but not all, crimes may present a
10 We expect that our five criteria, and our exposition in this Part of their basis, will be relatively
uncontroversial in terms of identifying traits of a criminal code. It is certainly possible, however, that
there are additional such traits that we neglected, or that reasonable minds may differ over the proper
emphasis to give one goal relative to others. For a fuller discussion of the functions and goals of crimi-
nal statutes, see generally ROBINSON, supra note 4; GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE
GENERAL PART (2d ed. 196 1); Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 NW. U. L.
REV. 857 (1994); and Robinson, supra note 5.
11 See infra Appendix A, Question 1, for a summary list of these factors.
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particular problem: to the extent that a seemingly unified "criminal code"
will lead citizens to believe that all crimes are included therein, the exis-
tence of additional criminal provisions outside the code will frustrate citi-
zens' expectations.
A second, and subtler, "notice" problem will affect the legislature itself.
If crimes are spread throughout the state statutory code, the legislature will be
less likely to view the criminal law as a consistent, unified scheme. A new
offense may be placed outside the code, making it less likely that the legisla-
ture will consider how that offense fits within the existing matrix of criminal
offenses. Additionally, the criminal code itself may be amended without con-
sideration of the amendment's impact on offenses outside the code.
t2
Third, the presence of criminal offenses outside the code will likely gen-
erate problems of statutory construction. For example, it may not be clear
whether the legislature expected the criminal code's "default" culpability
provision to apply to uncodified offenses. 3 In short, the possibility of crimi-
nal offenses appearing outside the criminal code undermines the entire proj-
ect of setting aside a separate criminal code within the overall state code.
Failure to eliminate the possibility of common-law offenses is a still
greater fault for a criminal code, for it creates a more significant notice
problem. The average citizen simply cannot be expected to peruse a state's
case law to ferret out nonstatutory offenses, and certainly not earlier English
case law. In addition, judicial authority to "define" offenses raises serious
democracy concerns. It is essential that the criminal law be rooted in le-
gitimate moral consensus; otherwise the law will be unsatisfactory both on
normative grounds and in practical or utilitarian terms. As a normative
matter, the law will not track the community's true sentiments with respect
to what conduct is considered blameworthy. As a practical matter, a code
that does not accurately parallel community norms will fail to deter some
objectionable conduct; it will over-deter some unobjectionable conduct; and
(because its moral sanction will not be taken seriously by the regulated
population) it will under-deter even the "bad" conduct it proscribes.
Though the legislative determinations may at times be a poor proxy for
genuine community consensus, they are doubtless superior in this respect to
judicial determinations.
2. Speciflcation of Affirmative Duties and Justification Rules. A
criminal code must communicate not just what persons may not do, but also
12 For example, the legislature may modify the length of the sentencing range for an offense grade
without considering uncodified offenses falling within that grade. At the very least, the existence ofun-
codified offenses would make such legislative tasks considerably more difficult.
13 This is especially significant given the categories of offenses that most commonly fall outside
criminal codes: narcotics and firearms offenses. Absent a clear legislative statement, the proper requi-
site culpability level with respect to significant elements of these offenses-eg., whether a subtance is
in fact the controlled substance in question, how much of that substance is in one's possession, wheth-r
one's weapon is automatic or semiautomatic-will be far from obvious.
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the conduct that a person must perform on pain of criminal liability--that is,
conduct mandated by a legal duty--and the conduct that a person may per-
form under certain conditions although it otherwise would be prohibited-
that is, conduct that would be criminal but for a justification defense. A
code that fails to make clear the duties that can give rise to criminal liabil-
ity, or fails to define fully the conditions under which otherwise criminal
conduct is permitted, does not adequately advise citizens of the rules of
conduct the criminal law sets for them.
The need for a comprehensive statement of the rules of conduct applies
no less to the criminalization of a failure to act than to affirmative conduct
offenses. Yet even the Model Penal Code-which forbids the creation of
common-law offensesl 4-provides that courts, in addition to legislatures,
may define such affirmative duties upon which criminal liability may be
imposed.'" There seems to be no principled basis for distinguishing omis-
sions from acts in this way. If anything, it is more important that the legis-
lature specify with precision the situations in which failure to act may lead
to criminal liability. This is particularly true given our law's general reluc-
tance to hold people legally accountable for their omissions."6 The default
expectation in a system such as ours is that doing nothing at all will not
raise the possibility of criminal punishment.'7 Of course, there may well be
situations where the community's moral consensus holds that one cannot
stand idly by; in such situations, one is obliged to do something or risk be-
ing branded a criminal. It should be incumbent on the legislature, however,
to notify the public as to these obligations by way of an explicit codified
provision. Accordingly, it is at least as improper for a code to allow courts
to define common-law "affirmative duties" of criminal moment as to allow
them to define common-law offenses.
The same notice concerns apply to the codification of justification de-
fenses. Absent a clear delineation of the situations in which otherwise pro-
hibited conduct will be exonerated, the criminal code will over-deter and
discourage people from engaging in conduct that the law is happy to have
performed, and indeed may well wish to encourage. Notice is thus as sig-
nificant with respect to justification defenses as it is to the definition of the
contours of an offense in the first place. Indeed, delineation of justification
rules is best seen merely as a clarification of the true definition and scope of
14 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05(1).
15 See id. § 2.01(3)(b) (specifically, the Code discusses a duty otherwise imposed by "law").
16 See, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW § 4.4, at 107 (2d ed. 1995); I
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScOr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3, at 284 (1986)
("Generally one has no legal duty to aid another person in peril, even when that aid can be rendercd
without danger or inconvenience to himself.... A moral duty to take affirmative action is not enough to
impose a legal duty to do so."); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 197 § 3.4 (1997).
17 It is, perhaps, no mere rhetorical coincidence that the reflexive response of any American over the
age of three to nearly any accusation is to say, "I didn't do anything!"
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the conduct rules; no code of conduct can be deemed comprehensive if it
omits this necessary refinement.
3. Definition of Terms. To be truly comprehensive, a code must be
not only complete, but also precise; code provisions "covering" proscribed
behavior are useless if they do not clearly define the nature of the pro-
scr'bed behavior. For example, a code with a provision that simply reads,
"theft is prohibited," is surely complete in its prohibition of theft-whatever
that may be-but is so imprecise that it provides little useful information.
In such a situation, it becomes the courts' responsibility to ascertain the pa-
rameters of the code's meaning. One cannot understand such a provision
without reference to the case law that interprets it, and the objective of
comprehensiveness is not satisfied. Therefore, a truly comprehensive
criminal code must sufficiently define all relevant terms that reference to
outside sources is unnecessary.
18
B. Does the Code Effectively Communicate the Law's Commands to the
Public?
Even if a criminal code were perfectly comprehensive in setting out its
rules of conduct-defining prohibited conduct, required conduct, and the
conditions under which otherwise prohibited conduct is permitted-it
would fail in its function if it did not present those rules of conduct in a way
that a layperson could understand. Effective communication demands clar-
ity on two levels: (1) within each rule, and (2) in the organization of the
rules into a code. 9 These factors are described more thoroughly below and
are summarized on our Evaluation Form under Question 2.20
Is It also furthers the notice objective to structure the code in such a way that relevant definitions are
easily found and are not duplicative of one another. As with the objective of ensuring that all offenses
are codified, this requirement benefits both the citizenry (by making notification easier) and the legisla-
ture (by making later review and revision easier). For example, ira code defines ubiquitous terms such as
'intent" or "serious bodily injury" in one place rather than in several places, the reader knows to apply thl
same definition whenever she encounters that term, and the legislature can more easily revise the definition
of that term with reassurance that the revision will apply throughout the code. Cf supra section lI.Al.
19 In practical terms, effective communication would also demand that the code is actually available
and accessible to the public. Because evaluation of codes according to this factor would require extemal
research into matters falling outside the four comers of the codes themselves, such an assessment is out-
side the range of our immediate project and of this Article. For this reason, although it appears on our
Evaluation Form, it is bracketed to indicate that it did not guide our actual decision making. See infra
Appendix A at 2.F. Still, states' success in satisfying this goal could and should be a subject for future
research. Empirical questions on this matter would include: how do state governments make their
criminal codes available to citizens? Are these methods effective? Interesting policy questions arise in
this area as well. For example, should state governments place their criminal codes on the Internet,
where access is easy and the cost of provision is low, or would problems of authenticity and reliability
overwhelm the utility of this method?
The Evaluation Form also acknowledges the relevance of, but "brackets" as outside the scope ofour
project, other elements of codes' presentation in published form---such as the provision or abenc of
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1. Drafting Style. The criteria relevant to a determination of the ef-
fectiveness of the communication of a rule are obvious enough. The style
of drafting is important. Offenses ought to be drafted in a way that makes
the provisions understandable to a layperson. Thus, the rules of conduct
should use common and plain words where possible and provide straight-
forward definitions for other words. The sentences comprising each provi-
sion should be as short and clear as is feasible. Informative section titles
also can be useful. Each provision should bear a title or heading that accu-
rately summarizes the general nature of the conduct addressed therein.
There is one specific category of provision for which simple, effective
communication of the rules of conduct is particularly important: justifica-
tion defenses. Criminal offenses relate most commonly to behavior that
one may plan to do or not do in advance. At least in theory, then, one has
time to review even a reasonably complex criminal offense provision be-
forehand to determine whether one's planned conduct is a crime. Justifica-
tions, on the other hand, relate not to actions but reactions. They prescribe
rules that govern what one may or may not do in situations where one has
only a moment to decide what she will do (and, frequently, where it is im-
perative that one do something). For this reason, it is crucial that justification
rules be clear and simple '-so that one might implement them accurately at
a moment's notice, without time for reflection or deliberation.22
2. Organization. In addition to expressing each of its rules clearly, it
is critical that the code organize the rules effectively and sensibly. First, the
code should group similar offenses into categories to facilitate easy loca-
tion. Listing offenses alphabetically would seem a straightforward and
simple method, but that approach is not effective because offense nomen-
clature is not always known in advance (for example, the same crime may
be called "murder" or "homicide," "theft" or "larceny"). In other words,
alphabetical organization works only if one assumes the lay reader already
internal cross-references-over which the legislative body could have no practical control, even though
they might impact on the effectiveness of the code's communication.
20 See infra Appendix A.
21 Of course, to some extent, this notion would require that justification rules be simple in their sub-
stance as well as in the manner of their expression. We seek to take no opinion as to the proper content
of the rules, however, indeed, as we point out later, overly simple justification rules are at cross purposes
to the goal of accuracy in liability determinations. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. Here we
merely wish to emphasize the importance of articulating those rules in an especially lucid way. (The
natural conflict between rules of conduct and principles of adjudication over how detailed the justifica-
tion rules should be can best be resolved by having separate codes, as one of us has argued elsewhere.
See ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 188-90.).
22 That most criminal codes fail to express justification rules clearly or concisely may be a sign that
code drafters have not differentiated between justification defenses (which relate to conduct) and excuse
defenses (which relate to blameworthiness). See, e-g., MODEL PENAL CODE art. 3 (defining justification
defenses subjectively; a person is "justifiable" if she "believes" that circumstances exist that would
make her conduct justified).
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knows the official legal name of the offense. Further, the distinctions be-
tween somewhat similar offenses (for example, theft versus robbery versus
burglary) often become clear only when the offenses are viewed together,
especially given the possible problem of a code's containing overlapping
offenses, of which we shall speak shortly.
Within offense categories, it is best to list offenses in order of serious-
ness, either increasing or decreasing. This method makes the most serious
offenses easy to find, and, more importantly, it serves the important expres-
sive function of conveying to the layperson which offenses society deems
most serious. In many situations, citizens must consider not only the exis-
tence, but the relative magnitude, of the moral sanction associated with par-
ticular acts. In fact, some rules of criminal liability-such as the "lesser
evils" defense-rely directly on citizens' ability to discern and compare the
relative moral stigma attaching to different activities.
One common organizational fault of criminal codes is that they thor-
oughly mix the rules of conduct with the principles of adjudication, so that
a relatively simple conduct prohibition becomes lost in a mountain of com-
plex provisions for adjudicating violations of the prohibition. The most
egregious form of this flaw is the failure to distinguish between a code's
General Part, which sets out the principles of general application, and its
Special Part, which contains the specific offenses.
The presence of offense definitions that "overlap" to penalize the same
conduct in two or more offenses creates problems beyond mere sloppiness.
Overlapping offenses reduce the effectiveness of notice and the ease of ad-
judicative application because they confuse the reader. For example, how
should one read an offense provision that specifies as criminal an activity
already apparently covered by another, more general provision? Given the
general canon favoring a statutory reading that avoids superfluity, one
would have to assume that the general provision did not in fact cover the
more specific conduct. This in turn would suggest that the reach of the
broader statute is in fact more limited than had been surmised, affecting in-
terpretation of that offense in other areas as well. Unnecessary "add-on" of-
fenses also reduce the moral and practical force of a criminal code. Simply
put, the more provisions a code has, the less effective each provision is likely
to be. The moral gravity of committing a crime weighs less heavily as the
code criminalizes more conduct-particularly since at the margin, each new
crime presumably prohibits less blameworthy conduct than any pre-existing
crime. Moreover, true notice becomes less plausible as a citizen is expected
to keep an increasingly large number of possible offenses in mind at once.
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C. Does the Code Provide a Comprehensive and Accessible Statement of Its
Rules ofAdjudication?
Just as a criminal code must be comprehensive in its articulation of the
rules of conduct,23 comprehensiveness is an essential aspect of the code's
elaboration of rules of adjudication, although for somewhat different rea-
sons, as set out below. A summary of the factors we used to evaluate this
criterion appears under Question 3 of our Evaluation Form.24
1. The Need for Comprehensiveness. Undefined adjudication rules
vest unguided discretion in decisionmakers, which can breed disparity in
application and create the potential for abuse. The courts may ultimately
supplant the missing legislative rule with a judicial rule, but this effectively
amounts to a legislative delegation of the substantive criminalization deci-
sion. Moreover, development of an authoritative judicial rule takes time to
occur (assuming it ever occurs), and similar offenders having committed
similar offenses may experience arbitrary variation in liability determina-
tions during the interim. Of course, there are unavoidable limitations on the
legislature's ability to prescribe principles covering all adjudication deci-
sions in advance. Some situations are simply unpredictable. And in these
cases, the system must rely upon courts to provide an adjudication rule for
the case at hand. But a code ought to at least make an effort to state the
rules that it can, especially those typically needed for the adjudication of
unexceptional cases.
While both adjudication rules and conduct rules share a need for
comprehensiveness, the two serve different functions, and adjudication
rules are subject to a different set of problems than rules of conduct. Ac-
cordingly, a different drafting approach is needed for adjudication provi
sions. Greater detail often is desirable in adjudication rules because detail
increases uniformity in the adjudication of similar cases. 25 Greater com-
plexity is tolerable because decisionmakers will have legal training that a
layperson applying conduct rules will not. (Even juries get detailed jury in-
structions that give them the law governing the case.) Adjudicators also
have time for thoughtful reflection in applying the provisions. Additionally,
providing the average citizen with notice of the code's rules of adjudication is
considerably less important than providing notice about prohibited conduct. 6
23 See generally supra subpart II.A.
24 See infra Appendix A.
25 See supra text accompanying note 7.
26 Indeed, it has been argued that provision of notice regarding rules of adjudication is entirely ir-
relevant and possibly even counterproductive. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and
Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). We do not
support the notion of keeping the adjudication principles from the public. In an open society like ours,
they are bound to become public at some time. Any effort to hide them from the public will only pro-
duce a cynicism about the system that cannot help but undercut the code's credibility with the public.
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2. Complete Specification of Necessary Rules. The need for
comprehensiveness becomes clearer when we consider specific elements
of the code's rules of adjudication. First, the code must include and de-
fine the culpability requirements that will determine whether improper
conduct deserves criminal sanction. Without an exhaustive delineation of
culpability requirements, the relationship between those requirements, and
the manner in which the requirements will be applied to the rules of con-
duct, a criminal code has done only half its job: it has codified each actus
reus without any explanation of the corresponding mens rea necessary for
criminal punishment.
Additionally, no set of adjudication rules will have accomplished its
purpose if it ignores certain practical elements that bear on the connection
between conduct and liability. We shall refer to the rules governing these
elements as general adjudicatory provisions. For example, the issue of
causation, though evidentiary in part, is nevertheless critical to the determi-
nation that an actor's conduct amounts to a crime. The criminal code
should articulate the substantive standard governing when an act is the legal
cause of a result. Similarly, a code must include provisions explaining the
effect, if any, of a "victim's" consent to an otherwise criminal act.
A code must also include a clearly defined exposition of the contours
of each defense that will excuse improper conduct. Vesting the courts with
unfettered discretion to determine what counts as "insanity" or "duress"--
or worse, to determine whether these excuses will be available in the first
place-would undermine the goal of consistency and provide a delegation
of authority that ought to be reserved for the more democratic legislature.
Similarly, a code must address certain mental states that, although they do
not amount to excuses, nevertheless bear on the extent to which an actor
should be subject to criminal sanction. For example, although an offender
who voluntarily becomes intoxicated before committing a crime will not be
totally excused for that reason, his altered mental state may well mitigate
the proper extent of his criminal liability. Finally, the same holds true (in-
deed, probably even more so) for nonexculpatory defenses, that is, the rules
that prevent imposition of criminal liability even where the offense defini-
tion is satisfied and no justification or excuse defense is available, such as
"statutes of limitations."
Finally, a truly complete code will provide the courts with a clear gen-
eral message as to how they should read the code's provisions. Ideally, the
code's provisions will be so clear that the judiciary will have little trouble
applying them in specific cases. Yet, ambiguities, doubts, and unantici-
pated situations inevitably arise, and the courts will have to interpret the
code's meaning in situations where its language gives incomplete guidance.
The legislature should anticipate this eventuality and offer some general
prescription regarding the manner in which courts should interpret the code.
For example, even as it tries to avoid creation of overlapping offenses, a
95:1 (2000)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
code should provide rules to guide the adjudication of conduct that might
fall within several offense definitions at once.
3. Sufficiency of Detail and Ease of Use. Of course, as with the rules
of conduct, the mere presence of a rule of adjudication does not help if it is
not sufficiently thorough. Indeed, if anything, more thoroughness is re-
quired here-or at least, more rigorous language is needed to achieve the
goal of thoroughness. Whereas simplicity and economy are crucial for con-
duct rules, there is a certain virtue in detail as regards the elaboration of
adjudication rules. The goal of uniformity in application requires that the
code make clear which seemingly different offenders merit punishment in
equal measure and which superficially similar offenders must be treated dif-
ferently from one another. Similar cases must be treated equally, and dif-
ferent cases must be distinguished according to well-defined principles.
Increased complexity does not pose a problem for the rules of adjudica-
tion-they will be applied ex post by a neutral adjudicator who may give
them her full attention, rather than needing to be known ex ante by all citi-
zens all the time. Greater detail serves to confine the adjudicator's discre-
tion and focus her attention on relevant considerations rather than allowing
her to be swayed by unimportant concerns.27
D. Does the Code Accurately Assess Who Does and Who Does Not
Deserve Criminal Liability?
A central task of a criminal code is to impose punishment on those who
deserve the condemnation of criminal liability and to protect from punish-
ment and condemnation those who do not deserve it. Determination of a
code's success in accomplishing this task demands the most subjective
value judgments of any of our criteria, for it often verges on an outright as-
sessment of the normative propriety of the legislature's substantive deci-
sions about what to include in the criminal code. Still, it is impossible to
evaluate the utility or effectiveness of a code without undertaking some in-
quiry as to what it does and does not contain. Frequently this inquiry oper-
ates only at the surface of the code rather than delving into a sweeping
examination of its substance. For example, one can ascertain whether the
code establishes minimum culpability requirements for every offense with-
out evaluating the specific culpability level chosen for each offense. Some-
27 At the same time, however, there are certain provisions that relate both to conduct and to adjudi-
cation, namely justification rules, which exempt objective acts (rather than subjective actors) from li-
ability, but frequently do so on the basis of the reasonableness of the actor's presumed motivations.
Because of the interplay of act and intention in the context of justifications, added complexity makes
them better in terms of adjudicative accuracy but worse in terms of providing notice or expecting princi-
pled compliance. For example, the extremely detailed justification defenses in the Model Penal Code may
serve the adjudication function well, but they are far too complex to actually be known and applied cor-
rectly by the actor when she acts. See, eg.. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 3, §§ 3.04-3.05.
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times, however, substantive decisions impact so fundamentally on the effi-
cacy of the code--as a code, rather than a mere assemblage of rules that
may or may not have merit standing alone-that to evaluate the code's in-
tegrity is to evaluate those specific decisions.
This inquiry takes place on two levels. First, it is necessary to review the
code's rules of conduct to ensure that they satisfy a minimum threshold of ac-
ceptability in deciding what conduct to crininalize. We discuss this element
of the analysis in section II.D.1.28 Second, the evaluation must undertake a
more searching analysis of the code's rules of adjudication. This analysis it-
self has two components: the code must establish appropriate minimum cul-
pability requirements that determine when violations of the conduct rules
shall be deemed criminal; and it must include all appropriate defenses to
avoid imposing liability where an otherwise criminal act is justified or where
an otherwise criminal actor is excused. We discuss these two components in
sections I.D.2 and lD.3, respectively. Question 4 of our Evaluation Form
summarizes the specific factors used in evaluating this criterion.2
1. Appropriate Criminalization Decisions. The first tier of the
analysis of the accuracy of the code's liability assessments relates to the
rules of conduct: does the code criminalize suitably "bad" behavior and
only such behavior? Obviously, a code whose commands horribly fail to
mesh with the moral consensus of the regulated community will lack credi-
bility. A legislature can commit no more grievous fault when enacting a
criminal code than fundamentally to "get it wrong" when deciding what be-
havior to criminalize. Of course, many criminalization decisions vill re-
flect subjective value judgments as to which different communities might
reasonably differ, so it would be mere conceit to evaluate each provision of
a code based on one's own sense of its moral rectitude. One can, however,
impose at least two basic minimum requirements in this regard: a code
28 It may seem curious that we are again discussing the rules of conduct, ven though this criterion of
analysis purports to evaluate the rules of adjudication. This is so because the presence ofconduzt rules that
do not comport with public sensibilities regarding what conduct should be criminalized operates to under-
mine the code's adjudicative power. Though undesirable in themselves, these offenses may a-dequately or
even admirably fulfill the functions of a code with respect to rules of conduct; i.e., they may b- well-
organized and clearly articulated, such that the code has done its duty in notifying the public of their ex-
istence. Their presence in the code will, however, reduce the adjudicative accuracy of the code beause
it will guarantee, or at least raise the possibility, that persons undeserving of the stamp of criminal sanc-
tion will nonetheless be adjudged liable by a judicial decision maker. In other words, whatever one
might think about the activities outlawed by trivial offenses-most of which are, in fact, socially unde-
sirable-they do not merit the moral stigma (or the judicial resources) involved in a criminal proceeding.
Moreover, trivial offenses are undesirable not only because those activities themselves are minor or morally
insignificant, but because their existence subverts the moral and social power of the criminal code as a
whole. However slight its effect on the public, to criminalize the trivial is to trivialize the criminal.
29 See infra Appendix A.
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should not include provisions that outlaw patently trivial moral transgres-
sions or that are incapable of enforcement. I
The enactment of "trivial offenses" is itself far from trivial. Such pro-
visions undercut the moral force of the criminal law and may have potential
spillover effects on law enforcement or prosecution. Some people might
cite prosecutorial discretion as a panacea for any legislative overreaching.
However, such discretion is as likely to exacerbate as to counteract the dan-
gers of over-criminalization,3 1 and, in any event, blind reliance on discretion
at any level only opens the door to the type of selective, disparate treatment
that adjudication rules should combat.
Two specific code provisions can combat the possibility of imposing
liability for insufficiently serious acts. First, the code might (following the
Model Penal Code) include a general defense against punishment for a de
minimis criminal infraction. 2 Second, the code might (rejecting the Model
Penal Code) define a rigorous standard for imposition of liability for at-
tempted offenses. Such a definition of attempt would prevent imposition of
liability for acts that might never have posed a legitimate social danger or
on actors who remained likely to change their minds before following
through on their initial criminal intentions. By contrast, the Model Penal
Code, which imposes liability for any activity that constitutes a "substantial
step" toward the commission of the completed offense, has a relatively
weak and nebulously defined attempt requirement.33  Public sentiment is
strongly in favor of a more demanding attempt requirement.3 4 Use of the
lesser standard reduces the authority of the criminal code.
2. Appropriate Liability Rules. The second tier of the analysis under
our fourth criterion examines the adjudication provisions. This examination
looks to whether the actor, as opposed to the act, is sufficiently "bad" to
merit criminal sanction. The first element of this review asks whether the
code's adjudication rules set appropriate culpability requirements. Accurate
30 On the other side of this issue lies the possibility that a code will fail to criminalize conduct that
does deserve criminal sanction. Such "gaps" are exceedingly rare, however. The only recurring exam-
ple of failure to criminalize conduct that (we would argue) warrants a criminal conviction is the refusal
of some codes to provide generally for the punishment of negligent homicide. In keeping with generally
shared moral intuitions and strongly held convictions regarding the significance of resulting harm, see
infra note 34 and accompanying text, it is improper for a code to lack such a provision.
31 This is particularly true at the law enforcement level and especially so during a time in which the
"broken windows" theory of crime prevention advocates zealous enforcement of relatively minor
crimes. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York
Style, 97 MIcti. L. REV. 291 (1998).
32 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12. This general defense ensures a baseline level of moral credibil-
ity for a criminal code, as it guarantees against prosecution for insufficiently grave conduct.
13 See id. § 5.01.
34 See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 14-27 (1995).
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reflection of societal norms regarding the criminal sanction demands that
only the blameworthy be punished for committing bad acts. To ensure that
only blameworthy actors will be punished, the code must establish mini-
mum culpability thresholds. The easiest and best way to ensure that a
proper minimum threshold has been set for each offense is to provide a cul-
pability level that the adjudicator will automatically recognize as an element
of the offense itself when the offense is otherwise silent as to the culpability
requirement. Such a provision guarantees that an overzealous adjudicator
will not impose a strict liability or negligence standard where such a stan-
dard would be inadequate.35 More particular problems arise when codes in-
clude offenses that, by definition, fall below any proper culpability
threshold. For example, a generalized felony-murder rule improperly as-
sumes a degree of malice in taking human life under a broad array of cir-
cumstances.
36
3. A Comprehensive System of Defenses. The second element of the
analysis of adjudication rules asks whether the code contains all appropriate
exculpatory defenses. As noted above,37 a code that fails to include a de-
fense leaves the definition of that defense to the courts. In this situation,
not only is the legislative function of defining the scope of the defense
delegated to the judiciary, but the courts may very well reach the unsatis-
factory conclusion that the code's silence is meant to declare that the de-
fense is not available-a particularly plausible statutory gloss for codes that
define some defenses but not others.
It is imperative, then, that a code include all appropriate defenses and
leave nothing to the whim of the judiciary. Many of these defenses are un-
controversial, including both justification defenses that make otherwise unac-
ceptable acts acceptable (covering acts in self-defense or defense of others
and acts undertaken in a law enforcement capacity or while serving in a
similar position of "special responsibility") and excuse defenses that negate
culpability (insanity, immaturity, and involuntariness, including actions fol-
lowing involuntary intoxication). Two other defenses are less common and
35 Imposition of criminal liability under a strict liability or negligence standard has bcn ,idely
criticized, and rightly so, for it satisfies neither the consequentialist nor the retributivist theory of crimi-
nal law. See, ag., ASHWORTH, supra note 16, § 5.3(a); 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 3.8, at
348-49 & nn.32-33 ('For the most part, the commentators have been critical of strict-liability crimes.")
(citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CON.;T.IP. PROBS. 401, 423-24
(1958); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 109);
ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 228-30. See generally Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence ofbMens Rea
11-The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L REv. 337 (1989).
36 See. eg., I LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 3.12(h), at 419 (noting "a growing dissatisfaction
with the felony-murder and misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrines, concerning which there is a slowly-
emerging trend toward legislative abolition"); 2 LAFAVE & SCOT, supra note 16, §§ 7.5(h), 7.13(e);
ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 730-36. See generally Nelson E. Roth & Scott F. Sundby, The Felony-
Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads. 70 CORNELL L REv. 446 (19&5).
37 See supra sections lI.A.2. and ll.C.2.
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more frequently contested, but are also appropriate and desirable: the lesser
evils or necessity justification defense and the rare, but appropriate, excuse
defense of a reasonable mistake of law (whether based on the law's unavail-
ability or an actual misstatement of the law in an official document).39
E. For Those Offenders Held Criminally Liable, Does the Code
Accurately Assess the Proper Grade of Liability and Punishment?
The second part of the adjudication task is the determination of how
much liability and punishment ought to be imposed on an offender. A
criminal code's role in this process is to set the general range of punish-
ment, with the sentencing judge, often guided by sentencing guidelines,
finishing the task by fixing the amount of punishment at a particular point
within the range that the criminal code's grading judgment has identified.
Sentencing judges also will make the decision as to the method, as opposed
to the amount, of punishment: prison, house arrest, supervised release, fine,
community service, or some other form of punishment.
Evaluation of a state criminal code's accuracy in determining the ap-
propriate grade of liability and punishment for a given offense employs two
rather straightforward standards: (1) the consistency standard, which asks
whether the code grades similar offenses similarly and with respect to their
relative seriousness; and (2) the differentiation standard, which asks
whether the code recognizes all of, and only, the proper distinctions be-
tween different "degrees" of criminal conduct. The consistency standard
demands that offenses "equal" in gravity (though potentially vastly different
in terms of the conduct they proscribe) be treated alike by the code; the dif-
ferentiation standard demands that offenses differing in gravity (though
substantially very similar in terms of the conduct they proscribe) be treated
suitably differently. The factors guiding evaluation of a code's satisfaction
of these two standards are summarized under Question 5 of our Evaluation
Form40 and are discussed more fully in sections II.E. 1 and II.E.2.
1. Consistency and "Grading" of Offenses. Determination of the
extent to which a code satisfies the consistency standard requires an exami-
nation of the overall system for assessment of punishment levels under the
code. A critical factor here is the presence, and the sophistication, of a gen-
eral "grading structure" for offenses. For example, a code might define
seven grades of felonies and three grades of misdemeanors, each of which
38 See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 16, § 4.9; 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 5.4; ROBINSON,
supra note 16, at 407-14.
39 See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 16, § 6.7(b); I LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 5.1; ROBINSON,
supra note 16, at 549-54.
40 See infra Appendix A.
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is subject to specific minimum and maximum sentences or fines.4 ' Obvi-
ously, however, where codes do not grade offenses, but rather provide spe-
cific sentences for each offense, an examination of the relative
appropriateness of the sentences themselves becomes necessary.4
A grading scheme with only a few categories essentially delegates
most of the grading task to the sentencing judge. Few very broad grades
provide great judicial discretion, which undercuts uniformity in application
and increases the potential for abuse of discretion. Sometimes sentencing
guidelines will provide the structure and limits on discretion that a criminal
code's grading scheme fails to provide. But shifting the grading task to sen-
tencing guidelines also is problematic. Such a shift takes the jury, as well as
the procedural safeguards of trial, out of the process of determining the facts
on Which the amount of punishment to be imposed will be based.
At the most fundamental level, the overall complexity of a grading
scheme serves only as a proxy for a deeper review of the appropriateness of
each of the code's specific punishments. Even so, a system of grading
categories can be said to have its own practical value, for it forces the leg-
islature to consider the relative seriousness of an offense vis-a-vis other of-
fenses when assigning a grade to that offense. Clearly, the fewer grading
categories that exist, the more inexact (and inaccurate) these legislative de-
terminations, and the adjudicator's subsequent punishment measures, will
become. The absence of any grading scheme whatsoever necessarily makes
review of the code's consistency more difficult and enhances the likelihood
that legislative determinations respecting suitable levels of punishment are
being made on an ad hoc basis by offense.
Obviously, in addition to a review of the grading system of a state
criminal code, examination of a code's consistency demands a review of the
implementation of that system. The creation of a large number of grading
categories is useful only insofar as it enables the legislature to tailor pun-
41 Note that the actual sentences that attach to a given "grade" will generally have little significance
for the inquiry into the code's consistency. For example, if a code has six felony grades (say, "A"
through "F"), and all of the "A" felonies seem both similarly serious and more serious than any "B"
felonies, and so on for each grade, then the analysis is essentially over. The actual sentencing provisions
for any given grade are then irrelevant except (perhaps) insofar as the sentences for one grade vary
greatly from the sentences for the next closest grade, thus amplifying the significance of the legislature's
decision to place an offense in one grade rather than another (and making "mistakes" costlier).
42 Within this category, codes that not only fail to provide sentence grades but that also provide only
maximum sentences for offenses fare even worse under the consistency standard. Although the maximum
sentence, when compared with other maxima for other offenses, signals the relative seriousness of the of-
fense in the legislature's opinion, the absence of a minimum sentence forecloses any assurance that "more
serious" crimes will in fact be punished more seriously. That is, absent a statutory minimum, a violator of a
"high-grade" crime can still be given a "low-grade" penalty, so appropriate punishment is not guaranteed.
The same, ofcourse, holds true for states that have grading systems, but whose offense grades reflect
only sentencing maxima rather than ranges of appropriate sentences. See, e.g.. S.C. CODa AIN. § 16-1-
20 (Law. Co-op. 1995). This marks a second exception to the general rule that it is unnecessary to look
behind offense grades to the sentences associated with those grades.
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ishments to crimes, grouping offenses of similar seriousness together. Thus
the consistency standard also inquires whether the offenses in each grade
are actually roughly equivalent in seriousness or, where the code created no
grading system, whether all of the offenses for which the same sentence is
established are actually roughly equivalent in seriousness.
2. Recognizing Appropriate Distinctions. In evaluating codes' satis-
faction of the differentiation standard, it becomes important to look not at
the overall punishment scheme, but at the distinctions made within specific
sets of offense categories. For each category, the code should recognize all
appropriate aggravating and mitigating conditions when specifying different
"degrees" of an offense within the category. The code must establish the
proper weight of each relevant factor and the relation of each factor to other
factors. Obviously, the relevant conditions vary from category to category:
first-degree and second-degree sexual assault are (or should be) governed by
different distinctions than first-degree and second-degree larceny, One miti-
gating factor relevant to all offenses, though-and one frequently identified
in a general provision of the code for that reason-is the absence of any re-
sulting harm (i.e., the distinction between a completed and an inchoate of-
fense).43
This, then, sketches the factors that we looked to in evaluating a crimi-
nal code. Specific illustrations of good and bad code characteristics appear
in Part IV and will illuminate our more abstract discussion here. But before
turning to those results, we describe the procedures by which we developed
and applied our evaluation scheme.
III. METHODOLOGY
To develop a scoring system, we first attempted to articulate the gen-
eral goals a criminal code should seek to fulfill, as described in Part I. 4 We
then reduced those general goals to a more specific set of five criteria, de-
scribed in Part 1I. 41 Using these criteria, we drafted an evaluation form to
use as a guide to scoring. This draft form was tested on many codes and re-
fined, then retested and further refined, until we had crafted a final version
of the form.46 Below we detail the scoring method reflected on the form
and the process by which we used the form to arrive at scores for the fifty-
two American criminal codes.
43 For evidence that there is a widely shared and strongly held general public belief in the signifi-
cance of resulting harm, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, and ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
For a discussion of these goals, see generally supra Part I.
45 For a discussion of these criteria and the more specific factors we eventually employed to evalu-
ate codes according to each criterion, see generally supra Part II.
46 For a copy of the final Evaluation Form, see infra Appendix A.
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A. The Scoring System
The form asks five "questions" that track our five criteria. For each
'question, a criminal code is given a score between 0 and 4. A score of 0
would mean that the code qua code was entirely useless; that is, it did not
satisfy any of the specific objectives of a criminal code. A state with such a
code would be no better (with respect to that criterion, at least) than a state
whose criminal law was a complete mishmash of uncollected statutes, or
relied entirely upon common-law rules. A score of 4, on the other hand,
would indicate a code that could not reasonably be expected to be improved
upon in its performance of the functions captured by that criterion.47
To assist in scoring according to this four-point scale, we developed
two general guidelines. First, we devised general descriptions of the quali-
ties of a code that would receive a score of 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 for each question
and included these descriptions on the Evaluation Form.48 Deciding which
description best matched the reviewer's sense of the code's overall per-
formance on a given question would aid in the determination of a final
score. Second, after developing the specific scoring rules discussed in the
following paragraph, we collectively scored the Model Penal Code's per-
formance on the four-point scale for each question, thus producing one clear
benchmark for scoring other codes. Since the Model Penal Code scored
well on most of the questions, this benchmark was far more useful for good
codes than for bad ones. It often provided very useful guidance for that sub-
set of the codes. Because many codes follow the Model Penal Code in nu-
merous respects, any deviations could be highlighted and compared to the
Model Code, and a code's score could be revised upward or downward ac-
cordingly.
In addition to these general standards, we developed several specific
bright-line scoring rules and included them on the Evaluation Form.4 9
These rules most often took the form of restrictions on the maximum score
a code could receive if it failed to satisfy certain significant, and objectively
ascertainable, specifications.50 The rules are summarized in the margin. 1
47 But note our caveat, see infra note 248 and accompanying text, that criminal codes generally
could do a better job of articulating and announcing conduct rules if they segregated such rules into a
separate code of conduct.
48 See infra Appendix A.
49 See id.
SO Of course, additional problems could lower a code's score even further, and a code could receive
a very low score without having any of the specific problems we highlighted. For example, on Question
5, a code with no offense grading system could not receive a score higher than 2.0, but could certainly
receive a score below 2.0, and a code that did have a grading system could also receive a score of 2.0 or
lower because of other shortcomings. In short, satisfaction of a requirement was necessary, but not suf-
ficient, to receive a score above the maximum set out by the requirement.
51 For Question I, we mandated that a code's score could not exceed 2.0 if that code cither allowed for
the punishment of uncodified crimes or failed to include justification defenses. Obviously, a code with both
of these failings would receive an even lower score. It is important to note, though, that "maximum of 2.0"
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By way of justification for these rules, we refer the reader to our elaboration
of the concerns supporting the use of the factors to which the rules apply.52
Additionally, we underscore the fact that these rules all relate to factors
sharing the following three characteristics: (1) each is significant, address-
ing a fundamental (if not the fundamental) concern of the question to which
it applies; (2) each is pervasive, such that the impact of a flaw will almost
surely spill over, directly or indirectly, onto the code's ability to satisfy
other factors under the same criterion; and (3) each is objective, thus offer-
ing clear guidance to the scorer and making scoring more consistent. Be-
cause the rules relate to factors with these three qualities, it is almost certain
that any code violating a given rule would receive almost exactly the same
ultimate score even if the rule did not exist, that is, even if our scoring only
used broad standards instead of incorporating these bright-line rules.
B. Implementing the System
Using the evaluation form reproduced in Appendix A, two scorers,
working independently, scored each of the fifty-two American codes."
Discrepancies in the scoring on any of the five general questions were dis-
cussed and resolved at a series of group meetings attended by all members
of the project. Once all discrepancies of more than 0.5 were resolved,
sometimes requiring additional research into the codes, all fifty-two codes
were ranked for each question.
This first tentative ranking of codes for each question was then used as
the starting point for rescoring the codes.54 During this rescoring phase, a
is not the same as "automatic 2-point reduction," although it might have the same effect as the latter rule in
specific cases. Thus, a code that violated two "maximum of 2" requirements would not automatically re-
ceive a score of 0, nor does the fact that a violator of a "maximum of 2" rule actually received a 2.0 in-
dicate that that code is otherwise perfect and would have received a score of4.0 but for that violation.
This distinction is especially sensible if we assume that the gains from codification have diminishing
marginal utility such that the shift from 0 to 2 represents a more meaningful accomplishment than the
move from 2 to 4. Note at the same time, though, that-as with an object approaching the speed of
light-marginal gains, even if less important, are often more difficult as a score approaches 4.0. The
shift from 0 to 1 is therefore usually both easier and more important than the shift from 3 to 4.
For Question 2, we imposed a maximum score of 2.0 for any code whose organization was incom-
prehensible or arbitrary, and a maximum score of 1.0 for any code lacking a distinct "general part" for
basic principles governing all offenses.
Paralleling Question l's justification requirement, no code could receive a score above 2.0 on Ques-
tion 3 if it failed to include excuse and nonexculpatory defenses.
A code employing "criminal negligence," rather than a stricter baseline such as "criminal reckless-
ness," as its standard culpability requirement could receive a score no higher than 2.5 on Question 4.
Finally, there were two scoring rules for Question 5: a maximum score of 2.5 for any code lacking
an offense grading system, and a maximum score of 2.0 for any code that did not make a clear grading
distinction between inchoate and completed offenses.
52 See generally supra Part 1I.
53 This work was done not only by the co-authors but by all members of the Seminar. See supra
note
All rescoring and other quality control work was overseen directly by the three co-authors.
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single scorer rated all fifty-two codes but only for a single question, as a
means of more carefully testing whether each code's score for that question
placed it in the proper rank-ordered position relative to other codes.
After this second scoring round, a number of "quality control" measures
were executed as a final means of ensuring accuracy and consistency in our
scoring. The scorers for each question transcribed, re-verified, and expanded
their notes for each factor of the question they had scored during the second
stage. The notations for each of our 5 questions for each of the 52 codes gen-
erated a database of 260 "paragraphs" (though not written in full sentences or,
indeed, even in proper English at times) which would either justify the scor-
ers' decisions or make their analytical missteps or omissions obvious.
To ensure that the more nebulous, less quantifiable factors were given
their due and that codes' performances with respect to those factors were
evaluated and compared consistently, we also developed a set of numbered
"baskets" for each factor and required scorers, when finalizing their para-
graphs, to place each code into one of these baskets for each factor. A
code's basket placements would provide a convenient, if rough, shorthand
method for broad-based comparisons between any individual code and
other codes.56 Additional notes for each factor would enable recognition of
more subtle distinctions in order to "fine-tune" the scores for codes ranked
near one another. This more elaborate evaluation form, giving a set of al-
ternative categorization "baskets" for each factor of each question, is repro-
duced in Appendix B.
To complete the quality-control process, each scorer's paragraphs were
handed over to a reviewer who used the basket placements and additional
notes to assess the accuracy of the scorer's code rankings. Where the notes
seemed incomplete, the reviewer could ask the scorer to provide additional
information to supplement the existing paragraph. Where the rankings
seemed inappropriate, the reviewer asked the scorer for a justification of the
seemingly anomalous scoring, and the reviewer and the scorer then worked
55 For especially vide-ranging or subjective factors, we developed sets of "test offenses" to which
the scorer would refer in order to place each code into the proper basket. This would guarantee consis-
tent, neutral review of each of the codes on the same terms. Factors for which the basket-placcment
process relied on "test offenses" are noted on the Form provided in Appendix A, as are the test offenses
employed for each such factor.
The use of a numbered-basket shorthand to make crude initial comparisons should not b-- con-
fused with an effort to "score' or quantify each factor individually. Although the scoring ofeach code
for each question was numerical, and each question was given equal weight when tabulating a total
score for each code, the individual factors relating to each question were not assigned definitive scores,
objectively weighted, or "added up" to ascertain the score for the question. Case-by-case determinations
were made regarding a code's satisfaction of each factor and the factor's relative significance in fixing a
score for the code. The ultimate focus was always on arriving at a holistic evaluation ofthe code's per-
formance in relation to the abstract concerns addressed by the question and, importantly, in relation to
other codes' performances. The nature of the project, after all, involved both a cardinal measurement
(how close is this code to the "perfect 4" for the question?) and an ordinal ranking (is this code better or
worse than the other real-world legislative efforts?).
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together to arrive at a mutually satisfactory-and, at long last, final-score
for every code on every question.
These final scores appear in the ranking tables presented in Part IV.
The fifty-two codes' documentation paragraphs for each of the five ques-
tions are reported in Appendix C.
IV. RESULTS: RATING THE FIFTY-TWO AMERICAN CRIMINAL CODES
The performance of the codes varied greatly, both in terms of the
codes' scoring relative to one another for each criterion and in terms of any
particular code's performance across the various criteria. Close study re-
veals a remarkable variety of legislative approaches and decisions in ad-
dressing the task of fashioning a criminal code. Nonetheless, some general
trends emerged both for each question and with respect to scoring among
the different factors of a single question. Frequently, the codes in the top or
bottom scoring range for each question had a great deal in common. Sub-
parts A through E of this Part analyze general scoring trends on each ques-
tion and provide concrete examples of the successes and shortcomings of
American criminal codes with respect to each of our scoring criteria. Sec-
tion F discusses the codes' total scores for the five questions combined and
analyzes overall score trends.
A. Comprehensiveness in Stating Rules of Conduct (Question 1)
The codes' scores on Question 1 are as follows:
1 NJ 3.75 LA 3.3 WY 1.15
2 KY 3.7 WI 3.3 36 CA 1.1
3 DE 3.65 20 TX 3.25 37 NE 1
(MPC 3.65) 21 UT 3.2 38 WA 0.7
NH 3.65 22 GA 3.1 39 ID 0.6
5 AK 3.55 23 IL 3 NM 0.6
AL 3.55 KS 3 41 FL 0.55
AZ 3.55 ME 3 MA 0.55
CO 3.55 26 TN 2.95 MD 0.55
HI 3.55 27 CT 2.4 MS 0.55
MN 3.55 28 NY 2.3 SC 0.55
11 MO 3.5 29 OR 1.7 VT 0.55
12 PA 3.45 30 USC 1.55 47 VA 0.5
13 AR 3.4 31 SD 1.3 48 MI 0.45
ND 3.4 32 NV 1.25 49 DC 0.4
15 IN 3.35 OK 1.25 NC 0.4
MT 3.35 34 OH 1.15 RI 0.4
17 IA 3.3 52 WV 0.3
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Relatively speaking, the codes' performance on this question was solid
but hardly spectacular. Although the high scores were among the highest
for any question-as evidenced by the average of the codes in the top quar-
tile (3.569) and in the top half (3.381)"-numerous states had very low
scores. This is somewhat alarming, as a criminal code that scores espe-
cially poorly on this question is in many ways hardly a "code" at all, but is
rather akin to a patchwork full of holes.58 Below we consider states' per-
formances on each of our scoring factors.
1. Abolition of Uncodified and Common-Lmv Offenses. Four of the
five lowest-ranked codes under this question are silent as to whether com-
mon-law offenses can be prosecuted. The fifth, Rhode Island, explicitly
authorizes the prosecution of common-law offenses:
Every act and omission which is an offense at common law, and for
which no punishment is prescribed by the general laws, may be prosecuted and
punished as an offense at common law. Every person who shall be convicted
of any such offense which is a misdemeanor at common law shall be impris-
oned for a term not exceeding one year or be fined not exceeding five hundred
dollars ($500). Every person who shall be convicted of any such offense
which is a felony at common law shall be imprisoned for a term not exceeding
five (5) years or be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars (S5,000)."9
The possibility of significant punishment (here, up to five years' incar-
ceration) for an uncodified (indeed, unenacted) crime severely undercuts the
usefulness of having a criminal code at all.
On the other hand, the highest-ranked codes explicitly abolish com-
mon-law offenses. The five top codes all have provisions similar to section
1.05(1) of the Model Penal Code, which bars the prosecution of offenses
not defined by the criminal code or another statute. Thus, these criminal
codes limit criminal liability to those offenses whose elements are defined
and prescribed under the code, fulfilling the notice function.
2. Specification of Affirmative Duties and Justfication Rules. The
five lowest-ranked codes on Question 1-along with the vast majority of
the other criminal codes-provide no guidance regarding the existence or
nonexistence of affirmative duties. In contrast four of the five codes re-
ceiving the highest scores on Question 1-New Hampshire, New Jersey,
S7 These were matched only by their counterparts for Question 3.
5s Then again, if the low score results from failure to define terms, the state's criminal law ,ill in-
deed qualify as a "code," but in the cryptographic rather than the legislative sense. The current project
does not value the sort of codes that are difficult to "crack," however.
59 RI. GEN. LAws § 11-1-1 (1994).
60 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 202 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:6 (1996); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:1-5 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §12.1-02-01(1) (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
1.03(a) (Vernon 1994).
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Delaware, and North Dakota--deal explicitly with the subject of affirmative
duties. 6' Delaware and New Hampshire require that affirmative duties be
defined by statute, though not necessarily by the criminal code. For exam-
ple, Delaware's definition of "crime" provides that "'[c]rime' or 'offense'
means an act or omission forbidden by a statute of this state." 62 North Da-
kota and New Jersey have specific provisions governing the matter, but
they are not useful; they essentially track the Model Penal Code, which al-
lows for the possibility of criminal liability for affirmative duties defined by
common law.63
The lowest-ranked states under Question 1 have no general justifica-
tion sections. In fact, North Carolina is the only state of the lowest five to
include any justification defense at all-a specific self-defense provision
justifying "use of deadly physical force against an intruder."64 This repre-
sents a profound failing in the codes, for even a bad provision is better than
none at all. A code's total silence as to a justification defense leaves it un-
clear whether the legislature meant for that justification to exist. It seems
difficult to believe that none of the states receiving our lowest ranking
wished its criminal law to impose liability for acts of self-defense. Yet this
means that those states expected such a justification to be imposed by judi-
cial fiat. This is improper because it allows the courts to create any justifi-
cations they deem appropriate and ignore others that may well be
appropriate. In other words, it allows for-indeed, calls for-legislation
from the bench.
In contrast, the five highest-ranked codes all contain comprehensive
general justification sections covering self-defense, defense of others, de-
fense of property, acts undertaken within a law enforcement capacity, and
acts by others having a special responsibility. 65 Four of these five codes
also contain a "choice of evils," "competing harms," or "necessity" justifi-
61 Unfortunately, hardly any other states do so. Moreover, not even the four states cited go so far as to
define the specific affirmative duties, failure to perform which will subject a person to criminal liability.
62 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 233 (1995); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:6 (1996) ("No con-
duct or omission constitutes an offense unless it is a crime or violation under this code or under another
statute.").
63 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-1 (West 1995) ("Liability for the
Commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless: (1) The
omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or (2) A duty to perform the
omitted act is otherwise imposed by law."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-01(2) (1997) ("A person
who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless the person has a legal duty to perform
the act."). This language-"imposed by laW' or "legal duty"-may embrace judge-made, as well as
statutory, law.
6' N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-51.1 (Lexis 1999).
61 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 461-471 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 627:1-:9 (1996); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:3-1 to -11 (West 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 9.01-9.63 (West 1994);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-401 to -406 (1999).
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cation provision.66 Probably the most comprehensive of all is New Jer-
sey's, whose justification chapter contains nine substantive provisions as
well as a definition section.67
3. Definition of Terms. One function of a comprehensive criminal
code is to provide notice to the public of the conduct it defines as criminal.
The lowest-ranked codes under Question 1 fail at that task. The criminal
codes of North Carolina, South Carolina, Massachusetts, the District of
Columbia, and Rhode Island do not contain general definition sections and
rarely, if ever, contain definitions within specific sections. In fact, these
codes define even serious offenses incompletely or not at all. For example,
many of the lowest-ranked codes fail to define "assault." The Massachu-
setts code is typical; as to assault it simply says:
Whoever commits an assault or an assault and battery upon another shall
be punished by imprisonment for not more than two and one half years in a
house of correction or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars.
63
South Carolina's provision adds verbiage but not clarity or notice of
the offense elements:
If any person be convicted of assault, assault and battery, assault or as-
sault and battery with intent to kill or manslaughter and it shall appear upon
the trial that the assault, assault and battery, assault or assault and battery with
intent to kill or manslaughter shall have been committed with a deadly weapon
of the character specified in § 16-23-460 carried concealed upon the person of
the defendant so convicted the presiding judge shall, in addition to the pun-
ishment provided by law for such assault, assault and battery, assault or assault
and battery with intent to kill or manslaughter, inflict further punishment upon
the person so convicted by confinement in the Penitentiary for not less than
three months nor more than twelve months, with or without hard labor, or a
fine of not less than two hundred dollars or both fine and imprisonment, at the
discretion of the judge.69
Some codes fail to define even "murder" or "rape. '" These codes
completely, and inappropriately, delegate the task of defining major of-
fenses to the courts.
Even when offering some guidance as to the meaning of an offense, the
worst codes frequently fail to provide definitions for specific terms they use
in defining the offense. For example, Idaho's code uses the phrase "great
66 See DFL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:3 (1996) (providing for
"competing harms"); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2 (Vest 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 9.22
(West 1994).
67 See NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:3-1 to -11 (West 1995).
68 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13A (Law. Co-op. 1992); see also P-1. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-3 (1994).
69 S.C. CODEANN. § 16-3-610 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
70 See, eg., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § I (Law. Co-op. 1992) (ironically entitling provision "nmrder
defined" but not defining the term "murder").
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bodily harm" to establish an aggravating factor for a variety of offenses,"
but nowhere does the code explain what constitutes "great bodily harm" or
how it differs from simple "bodily injury." The District of Columbia's code
similarly uses the phrase "serious bodily injury" to define offenses in
Chapter 5 (assault) , but gives a meaning of that term only in Chapter 41
(sexual abuse). 3
In contrast, the five highest-scoring codes are thorough in defining of-
fenses. New Jersey's assault provision, both shorter and clearer than South
Carolina's, offers an example:
A person is guilty of assault if he:
(1) Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily
injury to another; or (2) Negligently causes bodily injury to another with a
deadly weapon; or (3) Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of
imminent serious bodily injury.74
Such a concise formulation is possible because blanket terms-such as
"purposely," "knowingly," "recklessly," "negliAently," and even "at-
tempt"--are defined in the code's general section. Additionally, the terms
"bodily injury," "&serious bodily injury," and "deadly weapon"-which also
recur in the code, but for a narrower range of offenses-are defined in a
separate definition section preceding the offense provisions for homicide,
assault, kidnapping, and rape.76 This structure is typical of the best codes:
providing a separate general "definitions" section," or a "definition" provi-
sion immediately preceding those offenses for which the definition is rele-
vant, for recurring terms.78
71 See IDAHO CODE §§ 18-805 (aggravated arson), -905 (aggravated assault), -907 (aggravated bat-
tery), -6101 (rape), -8006 (DUI) (Michie 1997).
72 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-504.1 (1996).
73 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4101 (1996).
74 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1 (West 1995).
75 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(b) ('West 1995).
76 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-1 (West 1995).
77 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 227 (1995); Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.061 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 625:11 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-14 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-04 (1997);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994). These sections can be quite lengthy, sometimes
containing several pages of definitions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (1999). For example,
Texas's general definition section contains 48 definitions spanning 5 pages. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. tit. 1, § 1.07 (West 1994).
78 As another example, Utah has an extensive general definition section in the general part of its
code and additionally employs sections such as § 76-6-101, which defines terms, like "property" and
"habitable structure," relating specifically to offenses against property.
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B. Effectiveness in Communicating the Rules of Conduct (Question 2)

























































































This question had an essentially bipolar distribution: a group of 33
codes receiving scores between 2.6 and 3.3, and a group of 14 codes re-
ceiving scores between 0.4 and 0.9. Such an outcome should hardly be un-
expected, for this question weighs heavily the code's organization, and
there are only a limited number of ways in which to organize a criminal
code, making it difficult for many codes to distinguish themselves or re-
ceive deviating "outlier" scores. Most states categorized offenses by type.
Nearly all of the others listed offenses alphabetically-a less satisfactory
organizational method. 79 Additionally, few states stood out in terms of the
clarity of their exposition of the rules of conduct, because even the best
codes commonly use unnecessary legalese to set out the rules of conduct.
Below we consider states' performances on each of our scoring factors.
1. Drafting Style: Generally. Five of the codes receiving the lowest
scores for this question-Rhode Island, West Virginia, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, and Mississippi-all frequently use confusing, convoluted, or ar-
cane language in setting out offenses. Consider, for example, Rhode
Island's murder provision:
79 See supra section II.B.2.
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The unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought is mur-
der. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of
willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing, or committed in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson or any violation of § 11-4-2,
11-4-3, or 11-4-4, rape, any degree of sexual assault or child molestation, bur-
glary or breaking and entering, robbery, kidnapping, or committed during the
course of the perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of felony manufacture,
sale, delivery, or other distribution of a controlled substance otherwise prohib-
ited by the provisions of chapter 28 of title 21, or while resisting arrest by, or
under arrest of, any state trooper or police officer in the performance of his or
her duty or committed against an assistant attorney general or special assistant
attorney general in the performance of his or her duty; or perpetrated from a
premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any hu-
man being other than him or her who is killed is murder in the first degree.
Any other murder is murder in the second degree. The degree of murder ma
be charged in the indictment or information, and the jury may find the degree of
murder, whether the same be charged in the indictment or information or not, or
may find the defendant guilty of a lesser offense than that charged in the indict-
ment or information, in accordance with the provisions of§ 12-17-14.'o
Who could seriously believe that this effectively communicates the
rules of conduct to citizens, or to lawyers, for that matter? How "willful,
deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing" constitutes a discrete subset
of killing "with malice aforethought" is unclear. The second sentence,
comprised of 165 words, resembles a maze designed for a lab rat.
The West Virginia statute banning desecration of the flag provides an-
other example of tortuous sentence structure:
Any person who for exhibition or display shall place, or cause to be
placed, any words, figures, marks, pictures, designs, drawings, or any adver-
tisement of any nature, upon any flag, standard, color or ensign of the United
States, or upon the state flag of this State, or shall expose or cause to be ex-
posed to public view any such flag, standard, color or ensign, upon which shall
have been printed, painted or otherwise placed, or to which shall be attached,
appended, affixed or annexed, any words, figures, marks, pictures, designs,
drawings, or any advertisement of any nature or kind, or who shall expose to
public view, manufacture, sell, expose for sale, give away, or have in posses-
sion for sale or to give away, or for use for any purpose, any article or sub-
stance, being an article of merchandise or a receptacle of merchandise, or
article or thing for carrying or transporting merchandise, upon which shall
have been printed, painted, attached or otherwise placed, a representation of
any such flag, standard, color or ensign, to advertise, call attention to, decorate,
mark or distinguish the article or substance on which so placed, or who shall
publicly mutilate, deface, defile or defy, trample upon or cast contempt, either
by words or acts, upon any such flag, standard, color or ensign, he shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be fined not less
than five nor more than one hundred dollars, and may, at the discretion of the
80 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (1994).
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court or justice [magistrate] trying the case, be confined in jail for a period not
exceeding thirty days. Any justice of the peace [magistrate] of the county
wherein the offense was committed shall have concurrent jurisdiction of such of-
fense with the circuit or other courts of such county. The words "flag, standard,
color or ensign of the United States," as used in this section, shall be construed
to include any flag, standard, color, ensign, or any representation or picture of
a flag, standard, color or ensign, made of or upon any substance whatever, and
of any size whatever, showing the national colors, the stars and stripes. This
section shall not apply to any act permitted by the statutes of the United States,
or of this State, or by the regulations of the United States army and navy, or of
the national guard of this State, or of the members of the department of public
safety [West Virginia State Police]; nor shall this section be construed to apply
to the regular issue of a newspaper or other periodical, or to any book, certificate,
diploma, warrant or commission, on which shall be printed said flag discon-
nected from any advertisement, or to the vignette of any political ballot I
The presence of multiple terms and confusing sentences detracts from
the comprehensibility of the provision. The passage uses long multi-clause
sentences with no organizational mechanism, such as numbering or letter-
ing, to break down and readily identify when and where a reader should
pause and consider what she just read as a distinct unit of information.
By contrast, the highest-scoring criminal codes are more clearly writ-
ten and easily understood. They use clearer language and more easily read
sentences, and sections are kept to a manageable length (as contrasted with
the sections outlined above). For example, compare Rhode Island's opaque
murder provision with these provisions from the Hawaii code:
§ 707-701 Murder in the first degree
(1) A person commits the offense of murder in the first degree if the
person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of:
(a) More than one person in the same or separate incident;
(b) A peace officer, judge, or prosecutor arising out of the per-
formance of official duties,
(c) A person known by the defendant to be a witness in a criminal
prosecution;
(d) A person by a hired killer, in which event both the person hired
and the person responsible for hiring the killer shall be pun-
ished under this section; or
(e) A person while the defendant was imprisoned.
(2) Murder in the first degree is a felony for which the defendant shall
be sentenced to imprisonment as provided in section 706-656....
§ 707-701.5 Murder in the second degree
(1) Except as provided in section 707-701, a person commits the of-
fense of murder in the second degree if the person intentionally or
knowingly causes the death of another person.
81 AV. VA. CODE § 61-1-8 (1997).
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(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony for which the defendant
shall be sentenced to imprisonment as provided in section 706-
656.2
Although Hawaii's provision contains at least as much information and
refinement in specifying types of prohibited conduct as Rhode Island's, it
lays out that information in a more straightforward way. The above provi-
sion uses everyday parlance instead of overly legalistic terms like "deliber-
ately premeditated malice aforethought." Multi-clause sentences are
replaced with either short and concise sentences or are broken down and or-
ganized through numbering or lettering.
2. Drafting Style: Simplicity of Justification Rules. With respect to
the provision of justification rules, a low-scoring code may err in either di-
rection. Some codes fail entirely to provide any justification rules. 8 3 Others
provide rules that are so complex as to make their practical application im-
possible, hence-in terms of notice and behavior modification-nearly as bad
as providing no rule at all. In the latter category fall such states as Nebraska
and Connecticut. Nebraska's self-defense provision reads as follows:
Use of force in self-protection.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 28-1414, the
use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the
actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the pur-
pose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such
other person on the present occasion.
(2) The use of such force is not justifiable under this section to resist an
arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, al-
though the arrest is unlawful.
(3) The use of such force is not justifiable under this section to resist
force used by the occupier or possessor of property or by another
person on his behalf, where the actor knows that the person using
the force is doing so under a claim of right to protect the property,
except that this limitation shall not apply if:
(a) The actor is a public officer acting in the performance of his
duties or a person lawfully assisting him therein or a person
making or assisting in a lawful arrest;
(b) The actor has been unlawfully dispossessed of the property and
is making a reentry or recapture justified by section 28-1411;
or
(c) The actor believes that such force is necessary to protect him-
self against death or serious bodily harm.
(4) The use of deadly force shall not be justifiable under this section
unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect him-
82 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 707-701, -701.5 (Miehie 1994).
83 For instance, the ten lowest-scoring states on Question 2 all lack justification defenses in their
criminal codes.
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self against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual inter-
course compelled by force or threat, nor is it justifiable ifi
(a) The actor, with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily
harm, provoked the use of force against himself in the same
encounter; or
(b) The actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such
force with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering
possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right
thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from
any action which he has no duty to take, except that:
(i) The actor shall not be obliged to retreat from his dwelling
or place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is
assailed in his place of work by another person whose
place of work the actor knows it to be; and
(ii) A public officer justified in using force in the performance
of his duties or a person justified in using force in his as-
sistance or a person justified in using force in making an
arrest or preventing an escape shall not be obliged to desist
from efforts to perform such duty, effect such arrest or
prevent such escape because of resistance or threatened re-
sistance by or on behalf of the person against whom such
action is directed.
(5) Except as required by subsections (3) and (4) of this section, a per-
son employing protective force may estimate the necessity thereof
under the circumstances as he believes them to be when the force is
used, without retreating, surrendering possession, doing any other
act which he has no legal duty to do, or abstaining from any lawful
action.
(6) The justification afforded by this section extends to the use of con-
finement as protective force only if the actor takes all reasonable
measures to terminate the confinement as soon as he knows that he
safely can do so unless the person confined has been arrested on a
charge of crime.?
Connecticut's corresponding provision is only slightly less verboseSS
It seems unrealistic to think that such provisions could give real guidance to
a person caught in a self-defense situation.
The better codes, on the other hand, contain justification rules that are
easier for a layperson to understand and remember. An example is Ore-
gon's provisions covering the defense of oneself or another person, which
read as follows:
161.209. Use of physical force in defense of a person.
Except as provided in ORS 161.215 and 161.219, a person is justified
in using physical force upon another person for self-defense or to de-
84 NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1409 (1995).
85 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-19 (1995).
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fend a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the
use or imminent use of unlawful physical force, and the person may
use a degree of force which the person reasonably believes to be nec-
essary for the purpose.
161.215. Limitations on use of physical force in defense of a person.
Notwithstanding ORS 161.209, a person is not justified in using
physical force upon another person if:
(1) With intent to cause physical injury or death to another person,
the person provokes the use of unlawful physical force by that
person; or
(2) The person is the initial aggressor, except that the use of physical
force upon another person under such circumstances is justifiable
if the person withdraws from the encounter and effectively com-
municates to the other person the intent to do so, but the latter
nevertheless continues or threatens to continue the use of unlaw-
ful physical force; or
(3) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agree-
ment not specifically authorized by law.
161.219. Limitations on use of deadly physical force in defense of a per-
son.
Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 161.209, a person is not justi-
fied in using deadly physical force upon another person unless the
person reasonably believes that the other person is:
(1) Committing or attempting to commit a felony involving the use
or threatened imminent use of physical force against a person; or
(2) Committing or attempting to commit a burglary in a dwelling; or
(3) Using or about to use unlawful deadly physical force against a
person.
8 6
Though hardly simple, this provision at least holds open the possibility
that an average citizen could remember the justification rule and apply it
properly, as opposed to the complexity found in the Nebraska law, which
would require one to obtain a legal consultation-and an expensive one, at
that-before feeling able to defend oneself with legal impunity.
3. Organization: Generally. The lowest-scoring codes make clear
the pitfalls of alphabetical, or completely random, organization. Not only
does Vermont's code organize chapters alphabetically, but it often places
offenses into chapters almost arbitrarily: robbery appears in the chapter on
assault,17 while assault appears in the chapter on "breach of the peace"!8 8
Mississippi groups offenses into chapters by category, but organizes within
chapters alphabetically, thereby creating organizational confusion within
86 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.209, 215, 219 (1997).
87 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 608 (1999).
88 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1023-1024 (1998).
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chapters. The first four provisions of its chapter on "crimes against the per-
son" are as follows: "abduction for purposes of marriage"; "abortion;
causing abortion or miscarriage"; "abortion; advertisement, sale or gift of
drugs or instruments" (one section containing two different kinds of of-
fenses!); and "simple assault; aggravated assault; domestic violence.""9 The
"rape" offenses in that chapter are separated from the "sexual battery" of-
fenses by robbery, extortion, robbery again(!), "threats and intimidation,"
and three provisions on "timber, trees and saw logs."90 At the end of the
chapter comes the "Mississippi Cajacking Act," an obvious later addition
that the legislature did not bother to fit into the alphabetical scheme.9' Why
"extortion" would be placed between offenses starting with the letter "r," or
why "sexual assault" would follow offenses starting with the letter "t," is
unknown. What is obvious, though, is the confusion likely to result from an
organizational system (if it can be called such) that widely separates "rape"
and "sexual battery," which most people probably would not even suspect
to constitute separate categories of crime.
Some codes not only fail to provide offenses in order of seriousness, but
rather, use no apparent order at all. Massachusetts lists "indecent assault and
battery on person over fourteen"f92 before the more serious "assault and bat-
tery upon child causing bodily injury"93 and "assault, abuse, neglect and fi-
nancial exploitation of an elderly or disabled person,"9' all of which are
followed by the still more serious crime of 'mayhem, "9 s which is followed by
the less serious crime of "assault with intent to murder, maim, etc.,s 96 which
is followed by the more serious "armed assaults in dwelling houses. 97
The best-organized codes all reflect the indelible influence of the
Model Penal Code. Indeed, general organizational structure may be the
best available example of a useful organizational innovation offered by the
Model Penal Code and emulated by a large number of state criminal codes.
The general organizational scheme is easy to recognize: a distinct "general
part" (containing principles of liability, justifications, responsibility, and in-
89 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-1 to -7 (2000).
90 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 to -103 (1994).
91 MISS. CODEANN. § 97-3-117 (1994).
92 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13H (Law. Co-op. 1992) (maximum sentence of five years' im-
prisonment).
93 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13J (Law. Co-op. 1992) (maximum sentence of 15 years' impris-
onment).
94 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13K (Law. Co-op. 1992) (maximum sentence of 10 years' impris-
onment).
95 MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 265, § 14 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (maximum sentence of 20 years' impris-
onment).
I MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 15 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (maximum sentence of 10 years' impris-
onment).
97 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 18A (Law. Co-op. 1992) (maximum sentence of life impfionirrnt;
minimum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment).
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choate crimes) followed by a "special part" grouping offenses into catego-
ries (Offenses Involving Danger to the Person, Offenses Against Property,
Offenses Against the Family, Offenses Against Public Administration, and
Offenses Against Public Order and Decency). Additionally, offenses within
each category are arranged in decreasing order of seriousness. The organiza-
tional schemes of the codes of Colorado, Hawaii, Alaska, New Jersey, and
several other states generally reflect the structure of the Model Penal Code.
4. Organization: Overlapping Offenses. Codes that scored well on
Question 2 generally avoided the existence of multiple offenses governing
the same criminal conduct. Nonetheless, top-scoring states such as Colo-
rado,98 Alabama, 99 Hawaii,' ° and Minnesota'0 ' also contain general provi-
sions expressly governing the prosecution of offenses whose definitions
overlap. These codes typically emulate the Model Penal Code's provisions
on the subject.'0 2
Few of the lowest-scoring codes, and none of the bottom five, offer
any guidance regarding how to deal with overlapping offenses, even though
examples of overlapping offenses abound throughout those codes. For ex-
ample, Mississippi has numerous code sections relating to homicide, as
even a cursory review of section headings reveals:
§ 97-3-15. Homicide; justifiable homicide.
§ 97-3-17. Homicide; excusable homicide.
§ 97-3-19. Homicide; murder defined; capital murder.
§ 97-3-21. Homicide; penalty for murder or capital murder.
§ 97-3-23. Homicide; death following duels fought out of state.
§ 97-3-25. Homicide; penalty for manslaughter.
§ 97-3-27. Homicide; killing while committing felony.
§ 97-3-29. Homicide; killing while committing a misdemeanor.
§ 97-3-31. Homicide; killing unnecessarily, while resisting effort of
slain to commit felony or do unlawful act.
§ 97-3-33. Killing trespasser involuntarily.
§ 97-3-35. Homicide; killing without malice in the heat of passion.
§ 97-3-37. Homicide; killing of an unborn quick child.
§ 97-3-39. Homicide; drunken doctor, etc., unintentionally causing
death.
§ 97-3-41. Homicide; overloading boat.
§ 97-3-43. Homicide; ignorant or negligent management of steamboat
or railroad engine.
§ 97-3-45. Homicide; owner of dangerous animal.
98 See COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-408 (1999).
99 See ALA. CODE § 13A-1-8(b) (1994).
100 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 701-109 (Michie 1994).
lt See MiNN. STAT. § 609.035 (1987).
102 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07.
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§ 97-3-47. Homicide; all other killings.
§ 97-3-49. Suicide; aiding.
§ 97-3-109. Drive-by shooting; drive-by bombing.
While it may add precision to distinguish homicide by overloading a
boat from homicide by negligent management of a steamboat-both of which
doubtless occur frequently enough to merit separate homicide provisions-it
unnecessarily complicates the code, making it more difficult to determine un-
der which section certain conduct may fall or to determine why certain con-
duct would not be covered by the more general homicide provisions.
0 3
Other instances of overlapping coverage of violent conduct include
Massachusetts's inclusion of separate offenses banning prize fighting'e4 and
boxing matches for reward 05 and Maryland's overlapping sections for man-
slaughter0 6 and manslaughter by automobile or vessel.'0 Notwithstanding
its three general provisions for willful trespass, 08 Michigan's code also
adds specific provisions for trespass on a State correctional facility;'09 on
cranberry marshes;" 0 on huckleberry and blackberry marshes;"' on vine-
yards, orchards or gardens;" 2 and for trespass to destroy or remove speci-
fied "medicinal plants.""' 3 The text of the provisions makes clear that the
specific provisions are mere surplusage. Consider, for example:
Sec. 547. WILFUL TRESPASS BY ENTERING IMPROVED LAND OF ANOTHER
WITH INTENT TO INJURE ORDESTROY-Any person who shall wilfully commit
any trespass by entering upon the garden, orchard or other improved land of
another, without permission of the owner thereof, and with intent to cut, take,
carry away, destroy or injure the trees, grain, grass, hay, fruit or vegetables
there growing or being, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor....
Sec. 550. TRESPASS UPON VINEYARDS, ORCHARDS OR GARDENS-Any
person who shall enter a vineyard, orchard or garden, without the consent of
103 Of course, some forms of homicide may merit more or less serious punishment than others, but
this is a matter for the rules of adjudication, not the rules of conduct. Indeed, this example highlights the
difficulties-both practical and conceptual--that attend the mistake of complicating the rules of conduct
in order to make adjudicatory distinctions. Mississippi would better serve the notice function as to con-
duct if it had a single homicide provision ('thou shalt not kill") and another, more complex set of provi-
sions setting out the punishment for various homicides that were considered more or less blameworthy.
104 See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 9 (Law Co-Op. 1992).
1o See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 12 (Law Co-Op. 1992).
106 See MD. ANN. CODEart. 27, § 387 (1996).
107 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 388 (1996).
108 See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.546, .547, .552 (West 1991).
109 See MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.552b (West 1991).
110 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.548 (West 1991).
i See MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.549 (West 1991).
112 See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.550 (West 1991).
113 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.551 (Vest 1991).
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the owner, and pick, take, carry away, destroy or injure any of the fruits,
vegetables or crops therein, or in anywise mnure or destroy any bush, tree, vine
or plant, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
The two offenses are not exactly congruent-the latter provision cov-
ers the act of "taking" as well as the intent-but this is more confusing than
enlightening, especially since the same punishment is provided in both
cases. A single provision covering all relevant conduct would be clearer
and would avoid unnecessary questions of statutory interpretation.
C. Comprehensiveness and Accessibility of the Principles ofAdjudication
(Question 3)








































































Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the scoring results for Question
3 is the wide discrepancy between the states that performed the best and
those that performed the worst. The average scores for the top quartile
(3.573) and top half (3.394) were the highest for any question, edging out
the scores for Question 1. On the other hand, fully six states received
scores of 0 on this question. It is not especially hard to fathom the reasons
for this result. Question 3 is similar to Question 1 in that it addresses a fun-
damental element of a criminal code: the inclusion of rules governing ad-
judication of criminal offenses. But because the issues relating to Question
3 are more subtle-relating not to the obvious behavioral question of what
114 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.547, .550 (West 1991).
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acts are crimes, but the more sophisticated moral question of what actors
are criminals-some states either fail to recognize the need to address those
issues or, perhaps worse, deliberately abrogate that responsibility, leaving it
to the discretion of individual courts.
Probably the best example of wide disparity in the codes' efforts to de-
velop comprehensive adjudication rules is the inclusion of explicit culpa-
bility provisions. Most of the states that include such provisions follow the
language of the Model Penal Code, which is very detailed. Many other
states, however, fail to codify any culpability term definitions and therefore
receive low scores (or null scores). Below we consider states' perform-
ances on each of our scoring factors.
1. Specification of Necessary Rules: Culpability requirements. A
common characteristic of codes that scored poorly on Question 3 is the fail-
ure to define culpability terms and terms used Wvithin the code's adjudica-
tion provisions. Consider the example of manslaughter, an offense whose
conduct component-killing a human being-is identical to that for the of-
fense of murder; the two differ only with respect to the requisite level of
culpability on the offender's part. The following is the full extent of North
Carolina's manslaughter provisions: "Voluntary manslaughter shall be
punishable as a Class D felony, and involuntary manslaughter shall be pun-
ishable as a Class F felony."' 15 This provision offers no guidance regarding
the meaning of the term "manslaughter" or how the two forms of man-
slaughter differ from one another or from murder. Alternatively, some
other states at the bottom of the ranking use culpability terms but do not ex-
plain their meaning. For example, Wyoming's manslaughter provision
contains but does not define the term "heat of passion. ' 16 This is almost as
bad as not using culpability terms at all, since these terms are opaque on
their face and must be clarified by common law decisions.
Many of these same states also provide poorly defined or very loose
culpability requirements for murder. South Carolina's murder provision
reads: "'Murder' is the killing of any person With malice aforethought, ei-
ther express or implied." ' 7 Neither in this murder provision nor anywhere
else does the code define "malice aforethought" (either express or implied),
the culpability requirement of the offense. Similarly, Wyoming's murder
provision contains the term '"premeditated malice" but does not define it."8
Those states that are thorough in specifying culpability requirements
tend to emulate, if not parrot, the Model Penal Code. These codes define,
115 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-18 (Lexis 1999); see also, eg., MASS. AN. LAWS ch. 265. § 13
(Law. Co-op. 1992) (catchall manslaughter provision); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-4 to -5 (1997) (voluntary
and involuntary manslaughter provisions).
116 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-105 (Michie 1999).
17 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
Its WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101 (Michie 1999).
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in their general parts, a limited set of terms (almost always "intentionally"
or "purposely," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "negligently") that are then
used throughout the special part of the code to set out a culpability require-
ment for each element of each offense. New Jersey, Colorado, North Da-
kota, Missouri, Illinois, Texas, Hawaii, and a number of other high-scoring
states follow the Model Penal Code in this respect.1 9
2. Specification of Necessary Rules: Excuses and Nonexculpatory
Defenses. North Carolina, Michigan, Massachusetts, West Virginia, Rhode
Island, Mississippi, and Maryland are among the states that fail to define
any excuses or nonexculpatory defenses in their penal codes. Numerous
other codes include only a fraction of the commonly recognized excuses
and nonexculpatory defenses. For example, Iowa codifies only duress and
insanity, 12 and New Mexico's penal code contains only a statute-of-
limitations provision.
1 21
But even where excuses and nonexculpatory defenses are codified, the
provisions often are of little help when inadequately defined. Some codes
grant excuses to broad categories of actors, such as "the insane," without
explaining how the adjudicator is to determine who fits into such a cate-
gory. California's penal code is illustrative:
Persons capable of committing crimes-Exceptions-Children-Idiots-Luna-
tics-Ignorance-Commission without consciousness-Involuntary subjection.
All persons are capable of committing crimes, except those belonging to
the following classes:
[1.] Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the
time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its
wrongfulness.
[2.] Idiots.
[3.] Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged under
an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent.
[4.] Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious
thereof.
[5.] Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged through
misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil de-
sign, intention, or culpable negligence.
[6.] Persons (unless the crime be punishable with death) who committed
the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces suffi-
119 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-501 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-206 (Michie 1994); 38
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-5 to -8 (West 1999); MO. REV. STAT. § 562.016 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-
2 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 6.03 (West
1994); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
120 See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 704.10, 701.4 (West 1993).
121 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-8 (Michie Supp. 1999).
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cient to show that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their
lives would be endangered if they refused.'2
It appears that in California, the fact that a criminal is an idiot might actu-
ally be his saving grace.123
By contrast, the codes that received the highest scores for Question 3
codified a wide range of excuses and nonexculpatory defenses. For exam-
ple, New Jersey codifies defenses for mistakes of fact or law, 24 involuntary
intoxication,"as duress,126 lack of consent,127 entrapment,'2 insanity,'29 im-
maturi'ty,130 and involuntary acts,131 and it provides a statute of limita-
tions.13 1 Illinois,13 3 Missouri,134 Hawaii, 13S Colorado, 136 and Texas' 37 are
comparable.
3. Specification of Necessary Rules: Other Adjudication Issues. The
codes' performance with respect to the inclusion of general adjudicatory
provisions, covering issues such as causation, complicity, consent, and
multiple offenses, follows a common pattern whereby the codes may be di-
vided into three groups. In the first group are the codes that provide no
rules at all to govern these issues. 38 The second group includes codes that
offer provisions addressing the basics of these issues. 39 The third group of
12 CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1999).
12 Until recently, Oklahoma had a similar provision. In 1998, however, Oklahoma amended the
statute to replace the word "idiot" with a more thorough elaboration of the diminished capacity delense.
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 152(3) (West Supp. 1999).
124 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-4 (West 1995).
12 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-8 (West 1995).
'2 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9 (West 1995).
127 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10 (West 1995).
12 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12 (West 1995).
'9 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West 1995).
130 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-11 (West 1995).
131 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-1 (West Supp. 1999).
132 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-6 (West Supp. 1999).
133 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 516-1 to -3, 5)7-11 to -14 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
134 See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 562.031-.086 (West 1999).
135 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-218 to -237 (Michic 1994).
136 See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-708 to -803 (1999).
137 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 8.01-.07 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000).
138 The codes of Florida, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, and West
Virginia contain none of the general adjudicatory provisions noted in the text.
139 For example, Arkansas has a provision governing causation, but that provision is not especially
clear or thorough:
Causation may be found where the result would not have occurred but for the conduct ofthe
defendant operating either alone or concurrently with another cause unless the concurrent cause
was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the defendant clearly insufficient.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-205 (Michie 1997).
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states offers provisions that are more comprehensive, dealing not only with
the basics but also with a variety of related issues. For example, Hawaii's
code deals not only with the basic "but for" cause requirement but also with
issues that lawyers would call "proximate cause" and "transferred intent":
Causal relationship between conduct and result.
Conduct is the cause of a result when it is an antecedent but for which
the result in question would not have occurred.
Intentional or knowing causation; different result from that intended or
contemplated.
In the following instances intentionally or knowingly causing a particu-
lar result shall be deemed to be established even though the actual result
caused by the defendant may not have been within the defendant's in-
tention or contemplation:
(1) The actual result differs from that intended or contemplated, as the
case may be, only in the respect that a different person or different
property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm intended or
contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive than
that caused; or
(2) The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the
intended or contemplated result and is not too remote or accidental
in its occurrence or too dependent on another's volitional conduct
to have a bearing on the defendant's liability or on the gravity of
the defendant's offense.1
40
Hawaii's code also includes similarly thorough provisions covering complic-
ity, 141 consent,142 multipie convictions, 143 and liability of corporations. 144 The
codes of New Jersey,'4 Colorado, 46 and North Dakota 4 7 are also notable for
their detailed specification of general adjudicatory provisions.
4. Sufficiency of Detail and Ease of Use. Of course, since many
states at the bottom proved to have no adjudication provisions at all, it is
140 HAW. REv. STAT. ANN §§ 702-214, -215 (Michie 1994). Other provisions set out specific rules
governing the legal standard of causation in cases involving recklessness, negligence, and strict liability.
See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-216, -217 (Michie 1994).
141 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-221 to -224 (Michie 1994).
142 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-233 to -235 (Michie 1994).
143 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-226 (Michie 1994).
144 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-227, -228 (Michie 1994).
145 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:2-3, -6, -7, -10 (West 1995) (covering, respectively, causation, com-
plicity, corporate liability, and consent).
146 See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-505, -601 to -607 (1999) (consent; complicity, and corporate li-
ability).
147 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-05, 03-01 to -04 (1997) (causation; complicity, and corporate li-
ability).
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impossible to analyze whether they go into sufficient detail. The weakness
of such undefined terms as South Carolina's "malice aforethought' or
Wyoming's "premeditated malice," noted above, 4' is also obvious. The
term "malice" is inscrutable on its face and requires elaboration for adjudi-
cators properly to distinguish between actors who are suitably blameworthy
and those who are not. Broad and cryptic culpability terms suffer greatly
by comparison with the definitions of terms such as "purpose" under state
code provisions that follow the Model Penal Code's lead. New Jersey's
definition of "purpose" is representative:
A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a re-
sult thereof if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to
cause such a result. A person acts purposely with respect to attendant circum-
stances if he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or
hopes that they exist.'49
Even when the term "malice" is given a definition, the state it describes
often refers to a complex relation between thought, emotion, moral senti-
ment, and deliberative intent. The above definition of "purpose," on the
other hand, focuses on one's immediate attitude toward one's conduct, a
benchmark that is both more appropriate for adjudicative determinations
and more objectively demonstrable than the notion of "malice."
The same disparity between broad, amorphous terms and detailed defi-
nitions exists with respect to defenses. As we have seen, it is an absolute
defense to criminal liability in California to be an "idiot."' 50 Contrast that
with Hawaii's excuse provision, again based on the Model Penal Code,
covering "mental disease, disorder, or defect!':
A person is not responsible, under this Code, for conduct if at the time of
the conduct as a result of physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect the per-
son lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the PSr-
son's conduct or to conform the person's conduct to the requirements of law.
This provision, and others like it, directly describe the relation of intellec-
tual impediment to legal responsibility, the proper enterprise for an adjudi-
cative determination. The definition is subjective and calls for a complex
intuitive judgment by the decisionmaker, but that is inevitable in the for-
mulation of an excuse defense that tries to capture our complex notions of
blameworthiness. The Hawaii formulation at least gives the decision maker
a decisional framework for considering the question, something that the
"idiot' formulation does not even hint at.
148 See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
149 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(b)(1) (Vest 1995).
' " See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
151 HAW. REV. STAT ANN. § 704-400 (Michie 1999)
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D. Accuracy in Imposing Liability (Question 4)











































































































In terms of overall average score, the codes performed worst on this
question: the 1.803 mean was the lowest for any question by more than 0.3
points. Only 12 states received scores above 3.0, fewer than for any ques-
tion except Question 5. Even more glaring are the low-end scores: 17
codes received scores of 0.5 or lower, and the average score for the lowest
quartile is a microscopic 0.096. This reflects a combination of the two
trends we note elsewhere: that codes receive lower scores for our adjudica-
tion criteria than for our conduct criteria, and lower scores on "quality"
measures than on "comprehensiveness" measures.15 2 Many states simply
offer so little guidance, or such haphazard guidance, as to liability determi-
nations that they are scarcely, if at all, superior to outright delegation of
those determinations to the courts. Below we consider states' performances
on each of our scoring factors.
1. Appropriate Criminalization Decisions. The most obvious and
probably most plentiful, if not the most significant, flaw of low-scoring
criminal codes is their criminalization of conduct that is harmless at worst.
The codes of North Carolina, West Virginia, Mississippi, Maryland, Michi-
152 See infra subpart IV.F and Part V. Moreover, although for each of our final two criteria it is dif-
ficult for a code to score well, only for this criterion is it so easy for a state to score very poorly. See In-
fra text accompanying note 191.
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gan, and a number of other low scorers contain numerous provisions pro-
hibiting morally and practically trivial activities. As if conceding the arbi-
trariness of these determinations as to what acts the state should sanction
through criminal punishment, a few codes include offenses that apply only
within limited parts of their area of jurisdiction, as with Maryland's law
against fortune-telling:
In Caroline County, Carroll County, and in Talbot County every person
who shall demand or accept any remuneration or gratuity for forecasting or
foretelling or for pretending to forecast or foretell the future of another by
cards, palm reading or any other scheme, practice or device, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a
fine of not more than $100.00 or be imprisoned in the county jail for a term of
not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.15
Are the citizens of other counties unworthy of protection from fortune-
telling charlatans, or are the citizens of the three named counties considered
unusually susceptible to such ruses? However one interprets this provision,
some of the people of Maryland have good reason to complain about the
reach of this law--or would, were it not so utterly silly in the first place.
Maryland's code also includes no fewer than three provisions---each deal-
ing with separate counties, using distinct wording to define the offense, and
providing for distinctpunishment!-for prosecuting dog ovmers who fail to
confine dogs in heat-1 
4
In a similar vein, Michigan appears to have more concern about the
behavior of sleigh-drivers on its upper than on its lower peninsula:
BELLS ON SLEIGHS AND CUTrERS IN UPPER PENINSULA-Any person who
shall drive or cause to be driven, faster than a walk, on any public highway or
private road used by the public in this state, or on any street of an incorporated
city or village thereof any sleigh or cutter or other vehicle used as a substitute
for either, drawn by horses or mules, or by horse or mule, during the season of
sleighing without having bells on at least 1 of the animals so used or without
having bells attached to such sleigh, cutter or other vehicle so drawn, in such a
manner as to warn foot travelers of its approach, he or they shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor: Provided, That the provisions of this section shall apply to the
upper peninsula alone.'
5i
Many of Michigan's other offenses, though at least uniform in their appli-
cation throughout the state, are no less absurd. Michigan makes it a crime
to use "any indecent, immoral, obscene, vulgar or insulting language in the
presence or hearing of any woman or child,"' 56 and provides for up to five
153 MD. ANN. CODE. art. 27, § 158A (1996); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-358 (1999) (criminaliz-
ing violation of certain contracts between landlord and tenant for some counties only).
154 See MD. ANN. CODE. art. 27, §§ 70-70B (1996).
155 MicH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 750.494 (West 1991).
156 MIcm. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.337 (West 1991).
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years' imprisonment for "[a]ny man who shall seduce and debauch any un-
married woman."'5 7 Michigan also devotes an entire chapter of its penal
code to the prohibition of performing the national anthem with "embellish-
ments of national or other melodies," or "as a part or selection of a medley
of any kind," or "for dancing or as an exit march."'5 8 At least one of this
Article's co-authors, and doubtless some readers who concern themselves
with criminal law, may well be subject to prosecution in Michigan for pub-
lication of any printed material "principally made up of criminal news, po-
lice reports or accounts of criminal deeds or pictures, stories of deeds of
bloodshed, lust or crime.' ' 159
Michigan hardly has a monopoly on criminal minutiae, however.
North Carolina makes a criminal of "[a]ny person who bribes, or offers to
bribe, any judge or other official in any horse show, with intent to influence
his decision or judgment concerning said horse show.' ' 6°  California is
more concerned with horses themselves, prohibiting anyone from deliber-
ately tripping or poling them.'6 1 It is fortunate for Julius Erving that no
NBA franchise exists in West Virginia, as his conducting business there
under his usual basketball sobriquet would be punishable by the state:
Unlawful use of prefix "Doctor" or "Dr."; penalty.
It shall be unlawful for any person to use the prefix "Doctor" or "Dr." in
connection with his name in any letter, business card, advertisement, sign or
public display of any nature whatsoever, without affixing thereto suitable
words or letters designating the degree which he holds. Any person who shall
violate the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon
conviction thereof shall be fined for each such offense not less than ten nor more
than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail not more than twelve
months, or both fined and imprisoned, in the discretion of the court. 
62
A number of states contain archaic provisions prohibiting duels or
challenges to duel;163 Arkansas and some other states also make it a felony
157 MiCH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.532 (West 1991).
15s MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.542 (West 1991).
159 MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.41 (West 1991); see also PAUL H. ROBINSON, WOULD YOU CON-
VICr? SEVENTEEN CASES THAT CHALLENGED THE LAw (1999) (providing stories of deeds of bloodshed,
lust, and crime).
160 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-380.1 (1999).
161 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 597g (West 1998). California amended this provision, although not
significantly, in 1994. See 1994 Cal. Stat., 1st Ex. Sess., c.8 § 1. If anything, this manifest willingness
to tinker around the edges of insignificant penal laws reflects more poorly on a state than the legislative
sloth to which those laws' continued existence is normally attributable--especially when there are more
substantial shortcomings warranting attention. See e.g., supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (re-
garding California's "idiot" defense).
162 W. VA. CODE § 61-10-21 (1997).
163 See. eg., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 437.030 (Michie 1999) (prohibiting challenge to duel or ac-
ceptance of challenge; minimum sentence six months); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.171 -.172
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to "proclaim any other person as a coward, or use any other opprobrious or
abusive language, for not accepting a challenge to fight a duel or not fight-
ing a duel. ' "" These examples of trivial criminal offenses, or offenses bet-
ter dealt with elsewhere, are only a small sampling of such provisions in
lower-scoring states. Certain states just seem to have a knack for criminal-
izing the trivial.
Our better-scoring codes do not criminalize trivial behavior. Rather,
they concern themselves more with behavior that has a clearly identifiable
victim or that disrupts the proper and fair operation of the government than
with identifying "offenses" more properly remediable through private law-
suits or noncriminal regulation. This is not to say that lapses in judgment
by these legislatures do not occur.165 For high-scoring codes, though, such
incidents are rare and are not exacerbated by limiting the application of
trivial offenses to certain geographic regions of the state (which seems to be
a recurring theme in the case of the lower-ranking codes).
Moreover, the higher-scoring states presumably recognize that the kind
of behavior typically criminalized by such specialized provisions, if it in-
deed merits criminal sanction, will frequently already be punishable under
another, more general provision of the criminal code. For example, a vio-
lation of Michigan's provision regarding "Bells on Sleighs and Cutters in
the Upper Peninsula" would presumably also violate a typical reckless en-
dangerment statuteM6 --and if it would not, such behavior arguably would
therefore not constitute a sufficient danger to merit criminal punishment.
Another criterion for gauging how accurately a criminal code metes
out criminal liability is whether the code establishes satisfactorily demand-
ing conduct requirements for inchoate offenses such as attempt and conspir-
acy. The lower-ranked codes either do not provide a general definition of
(%Vest 1991); cf. MICH. COM. LAWS ANN. § 750.320 (West 1991) (making "second" to duel "accessory
before the fact to crime of murder" if death results).
164 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-15-104 (Michie 1997) (establishing sentence of two months to one year
"at hard labor"); see also MIcH. COMe. LAWS ANN. § 750.173 (West 1991).
165 Hawaii, for example, deems fit to include the regulation of cigarette packages in its criminal code:
Prohibited cigarette sales of less than twenty.
(1) It shall be unlawful to sell single cigarettes or packs of cigarettes containing less than
twenty cigarettes. It further shall be unlawful to sell cigarettes other than in sealed
packages originating with the manufacturer and bearing the health =arning required by
law.
(2) As used in this section, "to sell" include [sic]: to solicit and receive an order for, to
have, or keep, or offer, or expose for sale; to deliver for value or in any other way than
purely gratuitously; to peddle; to keep with intent to sell; and to traffic in.
(3) "Sale" includes every act of selling as defined in [subsection (2)].
(4) Any person who violates subsection (1), shall be fined not more than S2,500 for the
first offense. Any subsequent offense shall subject the personito a fine ofnot less than
S100 and not more than $5,000.
HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 712-1257 (Michie Supp. 1997).
165 Michigan itself does not have a general reckless endangerment provision.
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attempt t67 or provide that "any act" toward the commission of a crime con-
stitutes an attempt. Mississippi's definition of attempt is typical in this re-
gard, providing for attempt liability for "[e]very person who shall design
and endeavor to commit an offense, and shall do any overt act toward the
commission thereof, but shall fail therein, or shall be prevented from com-
mitting the same.' 68
A handful of states, however, do impose meatier conduct requirements
for prosecution of attempted offenses. Texas, for instance, defines an at-
tempt as "an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but
fails to effect the commission of the offense intended."' 69  Ohio, mean-
while, makes clear the importance of intervening events as the only thing
separating its definition of attempt from an otherwise enumerated crime. 170
2. Appropriate Liability Rules. In addition to including rules of con-
duct that outlaw behavior for which criminal sanction is inappropriate, low-
ranking states include rules of adjudication that fail to protect from criminal
liability conduct that lacks sufficient blameworthiness. An important provi-
sion in this respect is a general "read-in" rule specifying the default culpa-
bility requirement that will apply when an offense provision is silent as to
the culpability requirement. The worst codes, as noted earlier, fail to in-
clude any general part that delineates culpability requirements in the first
167 States whose criminal codes include no definition of the term "attempt" include, but are not lim-
ited to, West Virginia, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Maryland, and New Mexico.
168 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-7 (2000). "Any overt act" is too thin a conduct element for attempt, in
part because it fails to provide an actor with a reasonable opportunity to change his mind during even the
preparation stage.
Unfortunately, the higher-ranking criminal codes under Question 4 do not fare much better with re-
spect to this factor. instead of the "overt act" requirement, these states-following the uncharacteristi-
cally questionable guidance of the Model Penal Code, § 5.01-usually employ the only marginally more
rigorous definition of attempt as any "substantial step" toward the perpetration of an offense. "Substan-
tial step" may be too thin a conduct element since merely preparatory acts may be considered substantial
steps in an attempt to commit a crime, despite the fact that the defendant changed his mind after prepar-
ing to commit the crime (but does not satisfy the requirements of a renunciation defense). The more im-
portant objection to the substantial step is that it conflicts with widely held community intuitions that
would not impose criminal liability, even ofan inchoate type, until a person had done much more than a
substantial step. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 34, at 14-27. The Model Penal Code aggravates
this gap with community views by generally grading inchoate offenses the same as the completed of-
fense, also in conflict with community views. See id. at 20, 181-88.
169 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01 (a) (West 1994). Similarly, Minnesota, while requiring only the
"substantial step" of the Model Penal Code formulation, nonetheless curtails the thinness of the conduct
requirement by requiring "an act which is a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for, the
commission of the crime." MINN. STAT. § 609.17(1) (1987).
170 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.02(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000) (defining attempt to include
only "conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the offense").
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place.17' Several states with middle-of-the-road scores include culpability
rules, but have no read-in provision.1
72
The highest scoring states under Question 4-such as Hawaii, New
Jersey, Texas, Arkansas, and Alaska-all contain read-in provisions. Most
states provide for recklessness as the default culpability requirement for any
element of an offense for which the requirement is unspecified. A notable
exception is Alaska, which is even more particular about its read-in provi-
sion, stating that absent a specific prescription, "the culpable mental state
that must be proved with respect to (1) conduct is 'knowingly'; and (2) a
circumstance or a result is 'recklessly."'" 73
Some states laudably attempt to provide a read-in provision, but they
significantly expand the scope and application of various offenses in an
unjust way by providing for (criminal) negligence as the default culpability
requirement. With negligence as a baseline culpability requirement, a leg-
islature's failure to specify the culpability requirements for an offense ele-
ment may have significant consequences. Oregon is one state with such a
read-in provision.
Another example of a failure to limit liability to the degree of a defen-
dant's blameworthiness is an "unconstrained" felony-murder rule, i.e., a
rule imposing liability for murder for any death that results during the
commission of any felony, regardless of the intention of the "murderer."
New Mexico, for instance, includes as first-degree murder "the killing of
one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse... in
the commission of or attempt to commit any felony."' 75 Virginia includes
unconstrained felony murder as second-degree murder. 176 In addition to a
felony-murder rule for specified felonies" and a residual provision catego-
rizing any homicide during any other felony as manslaughter, 178 Mississippi
provides for a "misdemeanor manslaughter" rule.'79 Another common in-
appropriate liability rule found in low-scoring codes allows juries to render
a verdict of "guilty but mentally ill.'
80
171 The following jurisdictions have no general part: Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia.
172 See, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-501 (1999) (defining culpability terms); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 626:2 (1996) (same); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.00 (McKinney 1998) (same).
'73 ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.610(b) (Michie 1998).
'74 See OR. REv. STA. § 161.115 (1997).
'7- N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (Michie 1994).
176 See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-33 (Michie Supp. 1999).
177 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (1972 & Supp. 1999).
178 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-27 (1972 & Supp. 1999).
179 MISS. CoDEANN. § 97-3-29 (1972).
180 Such provisions are typically found outside the state's criminal code. See, e.g.. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 17-24-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (West 1982). For a sunurny of
the common criticisms of such rules, see PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAWv DEENSES § 173(h) (1984).
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The best codes, although usually codifying some form of felony-
murder rule, enumerate specific felonies to which the rule will apply.1
Even better are states such as New Jersey and North Dakota, whose codes,
in addition to limiting the felonies to which the rule applies, limit its poten-
tial to impose guilt without blameworthiness by creating "affirmative de-
fenses" for situations tending to negate culpability.' This approach is
functionally similar to the Model Penal Code's rule, which no state has
adopted wholesale, that death caused during the commission of a felony
creates a (rebuttable) "presumption" of culpability." 3 Only Hawaii has no
felony-murder rule at all. None of the best codes, however, attempt to cir-
cumvent the insanity defense through a "guilty but mentally ill" verdict.
3. A Comprehensive System of Defenses. The lowest-scoring states
under Question 4 codify no excuse defenses 184 or justification defenses3 5
whatsoever. For the high-ranking states, it is clear that the Model Penal
Code has set the standard of performance. The defenses of the best states
very nearly mirror those provided in the Code, although no state includes
every Model Penal Code defense. 8 6 For example, Hawaii tracks the Model
Penal Code's defense provisions-including involuntary act, ignorance or
mistake, intoxication, duress, military orders, consent, de minimis infrac-
tions, entrayPment, and insanity-with the exception of the defense of im-
maturity. Is New Jersey has no "military orders" defense, but was given
extra credit as the only state that provided a true "reasonable mistake of
law" defense.1
8 8
181 See, e.g., KANS. CRIM. CODEANN. §§ 21-3401(b), 21-3436 (West 1995).
182 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3.a(3) (West Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01.1.c (1997).
183 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b).
18 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op.
1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NEa. REV. STAT. (1997);
N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I.
GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE
ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN, (Michie 1999).
185 See, eg., D.C. CODE ANN. (1996); MD. ANN. CODE (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Law. Co-op.
1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. (1972); NED. REV. STAT. (1997);
N.M. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West 1997); R.I.
GEN. LAWS (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1998); VA. CODE
ANN. (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE (1999); WYo. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1999).
186 The Model Penal Code includes provisions covering the following defenses: involuntary act (§
2.01(1)), ignorance or mistake (§ 2.04), intoxication (§ 2.08), duress (§ 2.09), military orders (§ 2.10),
consent (§ 2.11), de minimis infractions (§ 2.12), entrapment (§ 2.13), public duty (§ 3.03), protection of
self (§ 3.04), protection of others (§ 3.05), protection of property (§ 3.06), law enforcement (§ 3.07),
special responsibility (§ 3.08), mental disease or defect (§ 4.01), immaturity (§ 4.10), and choice of evils
(§ 3.02). States adopting the MPC's "choice of evils" defense sometimes refer to it as the "necessity"
defense. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2 (West 1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22 (West 1994).
197 See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 702-200, -218 to -220, -230 to -237, 704400 (1994).
.88 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-4 (West 1995).
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A few states scored well under Question 4 despite paltry showings in
the excuse defense department. 189 These codes managed to score well be-
cause they are comprehensive in other areas-such as read-in provisions
and justification defenses, and a lack of trivial offenses-and because the
excuses they do include are more significant than those they omit. For ex-
ample, Texas's lack of military orders, consent, and de minimis defenses is
counterbalanced by that code's provision of mistake, insanity, involuntary
intoxication, duress, entrapment, and immaturity defenses. t90 Additionally,
the provision of some excuse and nonexculpatory defenses at least takes out
of the purview of the courts the option as to whether or not to allow such
defenses. Nonetheless, the more thorough a code is in providing excuse
and nonexculpatory defenses, the greater our faith in its reliability in accu-
rately assessing criminal liability.
E. Accuracy in Grading Liability and Punishment (Question 5)








































































In contrast to the scoring for the other criteria, few states scored ex-
tremely well or extremely poorly on this question: this was the only ques-
189 Tennessee, for example, managed to score a 3.35 under Question 4 despite the fact that it lacked
immaturity, consent, military orders, de minimis, and entrapment defenses. In fact, Texas managed to
obtain a 3.8 under Question 4 (slightly above the score given to the MPC for this question) despite the
fact that its code did not contain any military orders, consent, or de minimis defenses.
190 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-8.07 (West 1994).
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tion for which no state scored above 3.5 and no state scored below 0.5.
Also, unlike the Question 2 scoring pattern, the distribution of scores is
even rather than clustered. For example, thirty-six codes received scores in
the middle range between 1.0 and 3.0 (and about half of those were in the
middle half, 1.5-to-2.5, of that range), by far the most for any question. It
is, perhaps, especially difficult for codes to obtain a very high score for this
criterion because of the difficulty of attaining a truly comprehensive, con-
sistent, and rational grading system. It is quite possible, for example, for a
code to be completely comprehensive in elaborating rules, requiring no
further effort in that area, but it is less likely that one will conclude that a
state cannot improve on its grading scheme, either by making more grada-
tions of punishment level or finer distinctions between offenses. On the
other hand, no code utterly fails to satisfy the dictates of this criterion, be-
cause every code offers some suggestion of the appropriate punishment
level for a criminal offense, and any limitation on punishment that a code
provides is better than none. Only a state that provided no grading recom-
mendations whatever, or actually curtailed adjudicators' discretion in a
harmful way,' 9' could be as bad as total abdication of the grading function
(which would merit a score of zero). Even the worst states at least take seri-
ously the need to provide maxima for punishment, and that offers some util-
ity. Below we consider states' performances on each of our scoring factors.
1. Consistency and "Grading" of Offenses. Perhaps the easiest way
to get at the issue of consistency-or rather, inconsistency, as this method
will turn up only bad examples-is to see whether the state punishes appar-
ently similar offenses very differently. One remarkable example is Massa-
chusetts, which establishes a maximum sentence of three months for
participation in a "boxing match,"'192 but a maximum sentence of ten years
for the crime of "prize fighting."' 93 Because neither of these terms is de-
fined, it is not clear from the statute's face whether there is any difference
(a paying audience? an award to the winner?) between the types of conduct
proscribed by these two offenses. 94 Whatever distinction may exist, how-
ever, surely it does not merit a four thousand percent increase in potential
punishment as a crime escalates from the relatively innocuous practice of a
"boxing match" to the grisly barbarity of a "prize fight." Even Louisiana,
whose code is hardly a model of technical efficiency, manages to include all
191 For example, a code that imposed a maximum five-year sentence for rape or murder, or a mini-
mum five-year sentence for jaywalking, would confine discretion in a harmful way and be worse than a
code with no sentencing provisions at all.
192 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 12 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
193 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 9 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
194 One wonders whether such casuistic hair-splitting in a code covers more bases or fewer; with dis-
tinctions like this, would it be a defense to argue that one's behavior was neither a "boxing match" nor a
"prize fight," but merely a "pugilistic exhibition"?
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illegal boxing competitions in a single provision with a single specified
punishment range.
1
On the other hand, it is difficult, if indeed it makes conceptual sense
at all, to list or briefly describe specific good examples of consistency
within a code, since this criterion addresses each code's scheme of pun-
ishment as a whole. For this reason, and also because a code's relative
degree of satisfaction of the consistency standard frequently can be recog-
nized only in the breach, there are few "positive role models" that can be
summarized briefly.
That said, some codes offer certain structural features that make
clear, at the very least, that the legislature has taken seriously the project
of grading offenses consistently. Alaska, for example, does not merely set
out the sentences that attach to each grade of crime, but provides general
descriptions of the types of crimes that should fall into each grade.
196
South Carolina, after setting out its grading categories, lists all of the of-
fenses that fall into each category, enabling immediate comparison.'
Unfortunately, these codes' substantive grading decisions did not always
parallel their laudable efforts to make transparent (in one case) the guid-
ing principles driving the grading of offenses, and (in the other) the results
following from grading; neither of these two states ultimately fared espe-
cially well under our scoring system. Still, Alaska received a respectable
score of 2.9, and South Carolina performed better on Question 5 than on
any other question, even though its treatment of inchoate offenses was
among the worst of any 
state. 9
In addition to direct evidence from legislative decisions about punish-
ments for specific offenses, a code's potential to achieve consistency de-
rives from the nature of the code's "grading" scheme, if any. Arizona, for
instance, includes six classes of felonies, three classes of misdemeanors,
and a category of "petty offenses."'199 Other states are similarly sophisti-
cated.20 0 At the other extreme, some states lack any grading system what-
195 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.102.11 (Vest Supp. 1999).
196 See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.250 (Michie 1998).
197 See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-90, 16-1-100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999). But cf. S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-1-10(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999) (exempting certain offenses from classification).
198 See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
199 See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-601 (West 1989).
200 See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1-106 to -108 (Michie 1987) (5 felony categories, 3 misdemeanor
categories, and I "violation" category); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-104 (1999) (6 felony, 3 misde-
meanor, 2 "petty offense"); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-25(b)), -26(b), -27 (1994) (5 felony plus "un-
classified felonies;' 3 misdemeanor plus "unclassified misdemeanor," and I "violation"); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4201-03 (1995) (7 felony, 2 misdemeanor, I "violation"); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-
4704 et seq. (1995) (10 felony, divided into "drug" and "nondrg" offenses; 3 misdemeanor); NEB.
REv. STAT. §§ 28-105, -106 (1995) (8 felony, 7 misdemeanor); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-10 & 16-1-
20(a) (Vest Supp. 1999) (6 felony, 3 "misdemeanor," defined to include sentences up to three years);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1, -2 (Michie 1998) (8 felony, 2 misdemeanor).
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soever.20' On the other hand, the mere existence of a grading system would
not completely shield a state from a score reduction if it appeared that the
state did not take the grading project seriously. For example, Virginia's
criminal code includes an elaborate grading system (six felony categories,
four misdemeanor categories, and a separate category for non-offense
"violations"), 202 but includes many offenses for which a specific sentence is
provided rather than an offense grade.20 3 This system obviously undercuts
the utility of the grading system as a means of ensuring uniformity and con-
sistency in punishment.
2. Recognizing Appropriate Distinctions. In addition to grading
similar offenses similarly, a code must recognize relevant differences in
culpability level, conduct, or results that distinguish different "degrees" of
what might otherwise be the same criminal offense. Some of these distinc-
tions are general and apply across various offenses. The distinction be-
tween inchoate and completed offenses is an example of such a broad-based
distinction. Many states fail to consider the presence or absence of the
harm resulting from a completed offense to be significant in determining
the proper sentence. Some explicitly state that attempts are to be punished
similarly to completed offenses: the South Carolina criminal code, for ex-
ample, insists that "[a] person who commits ... [an] attempt, upon convic-
tion, must be punished as for the principal offense."2  In a unique
201 The codes of California, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachu.
setts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Oklahoma, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming do not
grade offenses-or, at most, divide them only into felonies and misdemeanors-but instead provide
maximum and minimum sentences within each offense provision itself. Idaho has a provision refer-
ring to three degrees of felony, see IDAHO CODE § 18-111 A (Michie 1997), but proceeds to provide
specific sentences for each offense without assigning the offenses to a category. See IDAHO CODE §
18-111 (Michie 1997).
202 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-8 to -9 (Michie 1996).
203 See, eg.. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-58 (Michie 1996) (armed robbery; sentence of five years to life
imprisonment); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-95 (Michie 1996) (grand larceny; sentence of I to 20 years' im-
prisonment).
204 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-80 (Law. Co-op. 1999); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1998);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101 (1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 1998). Some other states
provide that attempt may be punished as a completed offense with the exception ofcertain specific seri-
ous offenses. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-51 (1994) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "A"
felony); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:27.D (West 2000) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes or theft);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1-3 (1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit murder); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:5-4 (West 1999) (lesser punishment for attempt to commit "first degree" offenses); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit "AA" or "A" felony);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (Miehie 1999) (lesser punishment for attempts to commit capital crimes).
Interestingly, other states provide explicitly that attempts to commit specific serious crimes arc to be
punished as for the principal offense, while less serious offenses may not be. See MIcH. COMP. LAWS §
750.92 (1999) (attempted murder to be punished as murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1998) (at-
tempts to commit specified violent crimes to be punished as for completed crime).
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articulation, Mississippi quite charitably provides that an attempt may not
be punished more than the principal offense.20 5 Some other states are silent
as to the punishment of attempts vis-a-vis completed offenses generally, but
proceed to define offenses to include attempt on the same footing as the
completed act, thus allowing (if not ensuring) that the two will be treated
equally in terms of punishment. 205
Other, more specific distinctions constitute relevant aggravating and
mitigating factors that apply to particular offenses. Reviewing the codes'
treatments of such factors can make one feel like Goldilocks: some states
recognize too many factors, establishing different penalties based on ulti-
mately irrelevant concerns; some recognize too few, making only the
crudest efforts to acknowledge factors favoring an increase or decrease in
punishment; a scant minority of states manage to get it just right. This
section will present examples of the codes' best and worst efforts to rec-
ognize such factors with respect to three categories of offense: assault,
arson, and theft.
20 7
Three factors seem most relevant to the calculation of the relative se-
verity of assaults: the harm the assailant inflicted on the victim; the harm
the assailant intended to inflict on the victim; and any special qualities
(such as age or infirmity) of the victim himself. The presence or absence
of a weapon also has significance, but mainly as a proxy for an assess-
ment of the harm intended or the fear of the victim. Some states, though,
ignore these factors to a great degree and punish many different degrees
of assault similarly. Maryland, for example, allows all assaults to be
punished by up to ten years' imprisonment, except for those resulting in
serious physical injury or in which a weapon is used, which are punish-
able by up to twenty-five years' imprisonment.2° Vermont recognizes
three assault offenses punishing acts that differ little with sentences that
differ greatly: assault (causing "bodily injury"), punishable by up to one
205 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-7 (1999).
206 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (1996) (arson); IOWA CODE §§ 711.1. 712.1 (2080) (rob-
bery and arson); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12 (1997) (assault); MASS. COMP. LA\1S ch. 265, § 13A
(1999) (assault).
207 These offense categories were not randomly chosen. To avoid a searching review of every fac-
tor used by any code in grading any offense-a project that would clearly involve an enormous amount
of research and a considerable number of subjective value judgments-a limited number of offenses
were selected to form the basis for the evaluation of codes under this factor. Seeking categories that
were themselves significant, reflected a reasonable array of offense types (e.g., offenses against property
as well as the person), and would likely demonstrate a variety of legislative decisions as to grading fac-
tors, we selected the following: assault, sexual assault, arson, robbery, and theft. Robbery and sexual
assault are not used for purposes of illustration in the text, the former because it provides few examples
of differences among states, and the latter because it displays so many differences across states as to be
unwieldy for purposes of clear summary.
208 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12A (1997).
209 See id. § 12A-1.
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year's imprisonment; 2 0 aggravated assault (causing "serious bodily in-
jury"), punishable by up to fifteen years' imprisonment; 2 1 and maiming
("cut[ting] or disabl[ing] a limb or member of another person"), punish-
able by seven years' to life imprisonment.212  Some states, oddly and
redundantly, recognize these distinctions by enacting several offense pro-
visions, but proceed to categorize the different provisions within the same
grade.21 3 Some states are motivated by the three considerations above, but
follow those considerations to recognize specific distinctions that are ac-
tually irrelevant. For example, several states consider as an aggravating
factor whether the victim was the referee of a sporting event.214 Michigan
establishes a penalty of up to life imprisonment for armed assault with
intent to rob,2 1 and up to fifteen years' imprisonment for unarmed assault
with intent to rob,216 but a maximum of ten years' imprisonment for as-
sault with intent to maim,217 to "do great bodily harm less than murder,"
218
or to commit a felony other than murder or robbery. 219 Only a paltry few
states recognize appropriate differences based on relevant considerations
and only relevant considerations. Texas, for example, grades assaults
based on three factors: the culpability level of the offender; the level of
resulting injury; and whether the victim was elderly, a child, disabled, a
police officer, or a family member.220
Four considerations seem germane to the task of developing punish-
ment grades for the crime of arson: whether the arsonist has jeopardized
anyone's safety in addition to damaging property; the type of property dam-
aged; the value of the property damaged; and the extent of the damage to
the property. Most of the states that use "value" as a factor in sentencing
focus on the third listed factor (the original value of the property) rather
than the fourth (the extent of the damage caused by the arson), which is
perhaps more likely to be a suitable benchmark for gauging the seriousness
of an offense. A handful of states recognize more than one of these consid-
erations in making determinations of the proper punishment for an arson of-
fense. Kansas, for example, provides for sentencing variations based on
210 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1023 (1998).
211 See id. § 1024.
212 See id. § 2701.
213 North Carolina's code provides a specific provision for the assault on a handicapped person, but
assigns aggravated assaults against the handicapped the same grade (class F felony) as other aggravated
assaults. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-32.1, -32.4 (1996).
214 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:34.4 (West 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 650.1 (2000); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2712 (1999).
215 See MICH. COMp. LAWS § 750.89 (1970).
216 See id. § 750.88.
217 See id. § 750.86.
218 Id. § 750.84.
219 See id. § 750.87.
220 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01, .02, .04 (West 2000).
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both the presence (and the extent) of a threat to human safety and on dif-
ferences in the extent of the damage done to property. " t Many other
states, however, fail to recognize these distinctions or impose improper
distinctions. Maryland has a maximum punishment of five years' impris-
onment for committing arson on anything other than a dwelling or other
structure 2n but a punishment of up to ten years' imprisonment for threat-
ening to commit arson on a structure.2n The District of Columbia pun-
ishes arson committed on one's own property with intent either to defraud
or injure more severely than any other type of arson. 4  West Virginia,
along with several other states, defines one punishment for arson regard-
less of whether the building burned was occupied, unoccupied, or even
vacant,225 and barely distinguishes different types of buildings.226  Ver-
mont overcompensates for its refusal to distinguish between occupied,
unoccupied, or vacant buildings by imposing first-degree murder liability
in relation to any arson "by means of which the life of a person is lost.'
' 7
Nevada's very definition of arson assures oversimplified grading of pun-
ishment: "[a]ny person shall be deemed to have 'set fire to' a building,
structure or any property mentioned in [the arson provisions] whenever
22 See KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-3718(b) (West 1995) (creating three grades ofpunishrmnt based
on extent of damage to property); id. § 21-3719(b) (recognizing potential harm to human life as .ggra ating
factor); see also, eg., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-38-301 to 302 (Michie 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 703-820
to 824 (1997).
222 See MD. ANN. CODE art 27, § 8 (1997).
23 See id. § 9.
224 Compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-402 (1996) (burning one's own property, maximum punishment
of fifteen years' imprisonment), with D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (2000) (arson; penalty of one to ten
years' imprisonment).
2 See W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1 (1997); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (2000); MASS. GEN.
LAwS ch. 266, §§ 1-2 (2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-1 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. 205.010 (1997);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-301 (1999) (defining arson to include "knowingly darmaging] any structure
by means of a fire or explosion"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 502 (1998).
226 See W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1(b)(1) (1997) (applying the same offense to "any building or structure
intended for habitation or lodging in whole or in part, regularly or occasionally, and shall include, but
not be limited to, any house, apartment, hotel, dormitory, hospital, nursing home, jail, prison, mobile
home, house trailer, modular home, factory-built home or self-propelled motor home" and to "any ga-
rage, shop, shed, barn or stable"); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (2000) (including in arson
"bum[ing] or attempt[ing] to bum any dwelling, or house, barn, or stable adjoining thereto, or any store,
barn, or outhouse, or any shop, office, stable, store, warehouse, or any other building, or any steamboat,
vessel, canal boat, or other watercraft, or any railroad car, the property, in whole or in part, of another
person, or any church, meetinghouse, schoolhouse, or any of the public buildings in the District");
MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 266, § 2 (1999) (applying the same offense for burning "a meeting house, church,
court house, town house, college, academy, jail or other building which has been erected for public use,
or a banking house, warehouse, store, manufactory, mill, barn, stable, shop, outhouse or other building,
or an office building, lumber yard, ship, vessel, street car or railweay car, or a bridge, lock, dam, flume,
tank, or any building or structure or contents thereof").
227 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 501 (1998).
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any part thereof or anything therein shall be scorched, charred or
burned.
228
Gradations of punishment for theft generally look, quite reasonably, to
the object of the theft. Grading distinctions may be based either on the sto-
len item's value or its type. With respect to the former, it should always be
an improvement for a state to recognize more value categories, since this
ensures that the punishment will be increasingly narrowly tailored to reflect
the harm caused by the theft-at least, to the extent that value lost equals
harm caused. Indeed, some states recognize a fairly large number of value
categories. Texas, for example, grades punishment according to seven
value levels ($200,000 or more; $100,000-$200,000; $20,000-$100,000;
$1,500-$20,000; $500-$1,500; $50-$500; and under $50).229 Additionally,
some specific things may merit special concern when they are the objects of
theft; for example, many states punish more severely when a firearm is sto-
len, regardless of its value.230
A number of states, on the other hand, scarcely bother to consider the
significance of the value of the item stolen; several recognize as few as two
value categories, and others recognize none.23' Perhaps worst of all, some
states recognize only two value categories but provide for hugely divergent
punishments based on whether the value of the stolen item is above or be-
low the line separating the two categories. For example, Maryland provides
for a maximum of eighteen months' incarceration for theft of an item whose
value is less than $300.232 For items whose value exceeds $300, however
the maximum punishment increases to fifteen years of prison time.23
3
Montana,234 Michigan,235 Rhode Island,236 West Virginia,
237 and Vermont238
are substantially similar.
22 NEv. REV. STAT. 205.005 (1997).
229 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 31.03(e) (West 2000).
230 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-4(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(2) (Michie 1998);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) (Miehie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 812.014(2)(c)(5) (1999); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 708-830.5(1)(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-2407(1)(b)(6) (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/16-1(b)(3) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 17-A, § 362.2(B) (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 266, § 30(1) (Law Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 609.52(3)(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
637:11(I)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-1
(Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)(d) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055(1)(d) (1997);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(a.1) (1999); I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994), UTAH CODE, ANN. § 76-
6-412(1)(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999); WiS. STAT. § 943.20(3)(d)(5) (West 1996); see also, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-4-412 (1999) (theft of medical records).
231 For example, Massachusetts grades thefts based only on whether the victim is over 65 years of
age. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 19 (1999).
232 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342(0(2) (1996).
233 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342(0(1) (1996).
234 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-301(7) (1999) (value over $500, maximum 10 years; value under
$500, maximum six months).
235 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.356 (1998) (value over $100, maximum 10 years; value under $100,
misdemeanor offense).
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As for consideration of the type of item stolen, on the other hand,
more does not always mean better as far as the recognition of distinctions
is concerned. A number of states carve out specific punishments seem-
ingly at random for the theft of particular items. Mississippi's code serves
as an excellent-meaning, of course, a terrible--example. After distin-
guishing between grand larceny (stealing an item worth $250 or more-
punishable by up to five years' imprisonment, a $1,000 fine, or both)3 9
and petit larceny (stealing an item worth less than $250--punishable by
up to six months' imprisonment, a $1,000 fine, or both),240 Mississippi
creates particular punishments for shearing wool from a dead sheep, I
stealing milk from a cow,242 and stealing crabs or crab pots.243 Stealing
timber with a value of less than $25 is punishable by a fine of $200 to
$500, 30-100 days' imprisonment, or both; if the value exceeds $25, the
punishment is a fine of $200 to $500, one to five years' imprisonment, or
both.244 Theft of livestock, regardless of its value, must be punished by
one to five years' imprisonment and a fine of $1,500 to $10,0 0 0 .241
Stealing another person's dog is punishable by "a fine of not more than
five hundred dollars, or imprisonment in county jail for not more than six
months, or both, or imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one
year nor more than two years. 246
236 See R.L GEN. LAWS § 11-41-5(a) (1994) (value over S500, maximum 10 years; value under S500,
maximum one year).
237 See W. VA. CODE § 61-3-13 (1997) (value over S1,000, maximum 10 years; value under Sl,000,
maximum one year).
238 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2501, 2502 (1998) (value over S500, maximum 10 years; value un-
der $500, maximum one year); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2577 (1998) (imposing penalties for dis-
tinct crime of"retail theft": value over $100, maximum 10 years; value under $100, maximum six months).
In addition to creating an even larger disparity between potential punishments on either side of an arbitrary
line, Vermont's "retail theft" provision itself indicates the recognition ofan irrelvant grading factor.
239 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-41 (1994). The maximum increases to 10 years' imprisonment, a
S2,000 fine, or both, if the item is stolen from a place ofworship. See iL
240 See MISS. CODEANN. § 97-17-43 (1994). The maximum increases to one year ofimprisonment,
a $2,000 fine, or both, if the item is stolen from a place of worship. Se i.
241 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-49 (1994) (fine ofS5 to $25 and imprisonment for 5 to 20 days).
242 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-55 (1994) (fine of up to S100, imprisonment for up to three
months, or both).
243 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-58 (1994) (fine of up to S100, imprisonment for up to three months,
or both).
244 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-59 (1994).
245 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-53 (1994).
246 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-51 (1994).
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F. Overall Ratings
The codes' overall scores, the total of the scores from each of the five
questions, are as follows:
RANK [STATE 1TOTAL IQi Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
SCORE I
1. TX 17.25 3.25 3.3 3.55 3.8 3.35
2. CO 17 3.55 3.55 3.7 2.8 3.4
3. AR 16.8 3.4 3.2 3.55 3.15 3.5
4. AK 16.5 3.55 3.3 3.4 3.35 2.9
5. MO 16.3 3.5 3.2 3.4 3.5 2.7
UT 16.3 3.2 3 3.55 3.35 3.2
AZ 16.3 3.55 3 3.55 2.7 3.5
8. HI 16.25 3.55 3.3 3.7 3.8 1.9
9. NJ 16.05 3.75 3.1 3.7 3.8 1.7
TN 16.05 2.95 3.25 3.4 3.35 3.1
11. KY 15.85 3.7 2.9 3.4 2.75 3.1
12. ND 15.65 3.4 3.2 3.7 3.35 2
13. AL 15.35 3.55 3.3 3.55 2.25 2.7
14. IL 15.25 3 3.1 3.4 2.95 2.8
15. NY 15.15 2.3 3.2 3.55 2.8 3.3
DE 15.15 3.65 2.9 3.55 3.15 1.9
17. KS 14.95 3 3 2.4 3.15 3.4
18. ME 14.85 3 3.1 3.4 2.65 2.7
19. PA 14.6 3.45 3.1 3.4 3.15 1.5
20. WI 14.1 3.3 3 2.8 2 3
21. OR 13.6 1.7 3.25 3.4 2.35 2.9
22. MN 13.45 3.55 3.3 2.4 1.8 2.4
23. IN 13.3 3.35 3 2.8 2.65 1.5
24. IA 13.1 3.3 3.2 2.4 2.5 1.7
25. LA 13 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.5 1.3
26. MT 12.6 3.35 3 3 2.35 0.9
27. NH 12.4 3.65 3.3 1.5 2.65 1.3
28. SD 12.2 1.3 2.9 3.2 1.7 3.1
29. CT 12.1 2.4 2.1 3.4 2.3 1.9
30. GA 11.95 3.1 3.1 2.4 2.15 1.2
31. NV 11.45 1.25 2.9 3 2 2.3
32. WA 9.35 0.7 1.2 3 2.15 2.3
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RANK STATE TOTAL Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
SCORE
33. OH 8.8 1.15 2.6 1.5 0.6 2.95
34. NE 7.3 1 1.3 0.8 0.8 3.4
35. OK 6.9 1.25 0.8 3 0.55 1.3
36. WY 6.5 1.15 3 0.8 0.35 1.2
37. VA 6.2 0.5 2.7 0.5 0.1 2.4
38. ID 5.75 0.6 0.8 2.4 0.35 1.6
39. CA 5.15 1.1 0.6 1.5 0.45 1.5
40. FL 4.95 0.55 0.8 0.5 0.5 2.6
41. NM 4.65 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.15 2.2
42. USC 4.35 1.55 0.6 0.8 0.2 1.2
43. NC 3.9 0.4 0.55 0.5 0.05 2.4
44. VT 2.8 0.55 0.5 0.5 0.15 1.1
45. DC 2.7 0.4 0.6 0.5 0 1.2
46. MI 2.55 0.45 0.45 0.5 0.05 1.1
47. SC 2.45 0.55 0.6 0 0.1 1.2
48. MA 1.9 0.55 0.2 0 0.05 1.1
49. RI 1.75 0.4 0.5 0 0.05 0.8
MD 1.75 0.55 0.45 0 0.15 0.6
51. WV 1.55 0.3 0.4 0 0.05 0.8
52. MS 1.4 0.55 0.2 0 0.15 0.5
The codes fall into five roughly defined groups. In the first group fall
the top seven codes,247 which all score reasonably well on each question.
(We note that Tennessee and Kentucky, though falling slightly further down
the scoring list, also score well across the board.) Second comes a group of
codes, Hawaii through Pennsylvania, that perform well on most of the
questions but have unusually low scores on one or another question-usu-
ally Question 5, and sometimes Question 4. Most of the states in a third
group, between Wisconsin and Washington, are weak in two or more ques-
tions. Their scores often decline steadily as they move from Question 1 to
5, or at least are significantly higher for Questions 1 and 2 than for Ques-
tions 3, 4, and 5. (Interestingly, the Pacific Northwest states of Oregon and
Washington both defy this trend, and any other trends exhibited in our
scoring.) In a fourth group, from Ohio to North Carolina, the eleven codes
perform poorly on most questions but have one or (occasionally) two higher
247 The Model Penal Code would score in this group: ovcrall 16.55 (QI 3.65, Q2 3.2, Q3 4.0, Q4
3.7, Q5 2.0).
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scores, more often than not on Question 5. Finally, the nine worst codes re-
ceive uniformly low scores on every question.
Upon examination, a general trend reveals itself. The vast majority of
the codes that are neither consistently excellent nor consistently awful per-
form better with respect to the criteria that evaluate the rules of conduct
than those that evaluate the rules of adjudication. Nearly all of the codes
between Hawaii and Georgia on the list above fall within this trend. The
best of these codes-Hawaii, New Jersey, North Dakota, and possibly
Delaware-appear to replicate the failings of the Model Penal Code as well
as its successes, as they receive much lower scores for Question 5 than for
the other four questions. Forming an exception to the general rule that
codes score well on our conduct questions but poorly on our adjudication
questions is the relatively small group of states-Ohio, Nebraska, Virginia,
Florida, New Mexico, and North Carolina-that score well only on Ques-
tion 5. These states appear to have taken seriously the need to punish fairly
and consistently once a violation has been established, but have neglected
the task of defining the violations themselves; they poorly define, or fail to
define, the acts that are crimes or the actors that are criminals.
Yet we must point out two caveats to prevent the reader from translat-
ing the codes' scoring performance into a generalized impression that
American criminal codes are good at conduct rules (Questions 1 and 2), but
bad at adjudication rules (Questions 3, 4, and 5). First, the scoring criteria
for our conduct rule questions tend to be more relativistic, and somewhat
more forgiving of minor flaws, than are the corresponding adjudication
rules criteria. For example, some codes may receive our maximum score
for "drafting style" or "readability" because they are much easier to under-
stand than other codes, but this does not mean that they lack any significant
room for improvement in this regard. A truly objective and demanding
benchmark of clarity and concision would reveal these codes to be far from
perfect.248 Unfortunately, such a benchmark is difficult to devise, and any-
way, since the current project is comparative in nature, it would gain little
from uniformly reducing all of the codes' scores for a given factor.
Second, not all of the codes exhibit the tendency to perform well with
respect to conduct rule questions and poorly with respect to adjudication
rule questions. As one would expect in any analysis of the enactments of
fifty-two different legislatures, some of the scoring results reveal idiosyn-
crasies in some codes. New York, Oregon, South Dakota, and Nevada all
receive much lower scores for Question 1 than for any other question. Kan-
sas has a high score for Question 5 but a correspondingly low one for
24 For example, we are persuaded that a state can more effectively communicate its rules of con-
duct to ordinary people by segregating its code of conduct from its code of adjudication. See Robinson,
supra note 5, at Parts Ill and IV. But given how dramatic a change this would be from current usage,
which combines these two functions in a single code, we thought it inappropriate to reduce a state's
score for failure to follow such a course.
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Question 3. Connecticut, Oklahoma, and Idaho all have scores for Question
3 that deviate from their usual performance. But surely the most unusual
scoring pattern is that of Washington, the only state that performs signifi-
cantly better on the questions related to adjudication rules than on the ques-
tions related to conduct rules.
V. CONCLUSION
The codes' scoring averages on the questions posed by our study sug-
gest two observations. First, American criminal codes (excepting the hand-
ful of codes that seem to do everything poorly) tend to fare better in
addressing the quantitative "comprehensiveness" issues addressed by our
Questions 1 and 3 (which essentially ask, "is everything there?") than the
more qualitative concerns of Questions 2, 4, and 5 (which essentially ask,
"is everything good-or at least, consistent?"). Scores for the codes in the
top quartile and top half for Questions 1 and 3 were at least 0.20 points
higher than their counterparts for the three other questions. Second, in
dealing with the adjudicative aspects of their codes, few states have devoted
equal attention both to issues of establishing criminal liability and to issues
of grading the punishment of those held liable.
These observations give rise to obvious prescriptions for state legisla-
tures. The states whose codes are at the bottom of our ranklngs, when
making decisions about reforming their codes, should give priority to
strengthening their performance on Question 1 and 3 issues-increasing
comprehensiveness both in their statement of rules of conduct and, espe-
cially, their rules of adjudication. Comprehensiveness is both a fundamen-
tal necessity and-because, as a general matter, it demands addition of new
provisions rather than examination and amendment of old ones-a more
straightforward project than the projects suggested by other questions.
The states at the top, on the other hand, should focus on the concerns
addressed by Questions 2, 4, and 5. That is, they must strive to improve the
clarity of their rules of conduct and to ensure that their already-existing ad-
judication rules are thorough, appropriate, and reflective of the commu-
nity's moral consensus about the blameworthiness of conduct. Having done
this, those states should turn their attention to refining their system of
grading offenses to better approximate the proper level of punishment.
Of course, even if such reforms were to occur, the improvements
would be fleeting if later changes to the code were not tailored to the code's
structure and style. If nothing else, our study reveals that the creation and
maintenance of a sound code demands two things: expertise and vigilance.
A team of criminal-law specialists was needed to draft the Model Penal
Code, and even that code, in our view, is not flawless. As experience con-
firms, there is even less chance that state legislators will develop a genu-
inely good code. However sound their qualifications or strong their
dedication may be, legislative drafters are rarely even aware of, much less
95:1 (2000)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
worried about, the special needs of criminal codes. Even the best of codes
will slowly deteriorate without active oversight, as later generations of leg-
islators unfamiliar (or unconcerned) with the original code's scheme add,
delete, and revise provisions, oblivious to the effects of these changes on
the code as a whole. History indicates that the quality of the American
criminal codes enacted in the wake of the Model Penal Code's promulga-
tion has been eroded by subsequent modifications that disrupt the codes'
initial clarity and coherence.
For these reasons, we advocate the institution of standing commissions
to generate and monitor states' criminal codes. The idea, extreme though it
may sound, is hardly without precedent. England has such a commission,
as do many of the British Commonwealth countries. Most of the states that
have adopted a variation of the Model Penal Code formed such a commis-
sion to draft the code, but dissolved the commission once the task was
complete. We believe that these commissions could and should be kept
alive. The cost of a standing commission would be low if its membership
served only part-time and for low reimbursement (and perhaps were only
compensated for their expenses). In any case, the advantages of a standing
commission would far outweigh these costs, given the significance of the
criminal code as both an instrument of the state's power and an expression
of its values. The very immediacy and import of criminal law render it all
the more susceptible to mere politicking rather than deliberative craftsman-
ship. A renewed and dedicated attention to criminal code reform may yet
enable us to design codes whose quality is commensurate to the breadth and
gravity of their social role.





I. COMMUNICATING THE LAW'S COMMANDS
1. Does the code contain a comprehensive statement of the law's
commands? - (0-4)
Scores: 4 = fully comprehensive (MPC rates 3.8); 3 = some holes, but
generally comprehensive; 2 = many holes, but more codified than not; 1
= mix of codified provisions and case law references; 0 = depends al-
most entirely on case law or common law rules.
Factors:
A. Are all criminal offenses defined by the code? If not, how many
are not? Does the code have a provision (like MPC § 1.05(1))
that bars the prosecution of common law offenses or other of-
fenses not defined by a statute of the state?
AA. If prosecution of uncodified crimes is allowed, maximum allowed
score is 2. More points off if uncodified offenses can be pun-
ished seriously (e.g., more than a year in prison).
B. Are the terms used in the code of conduct defined in the code?
(also, but of less importance: Are the definitions in a place or one
of a limited number of places such that one could reasonably
know where to look for them?)
C. Are offenses defined incompletely, requiring reference to case
law to fully determine the offense's requirements? If so, how
often, and how serious are the offenses?
D. Are offenses defined by statutes outside the criminal code or
criminal procedure code other than minor regulatory offenses? If
so, how many and how serious? Some points added back if
criminal code contains a cross-reference to these no-criminal-
code offenses. [Less important than factors A-C]
E. Does the code (a) define the affirmative duties for which a person
may be criminally liable for a failure to perform, or (b) does it in-
corporate by reference statutory duties defined by statutes outside
the code, or (c) does it allow liability for duties imposed by law
other than statute (as MPC § 2.01(3)(b) allows)?
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EE. For (b), points off (very common); for (c), more points off and
maximum of 3.8
F. Are all justification defenses codified in the code? (Most states
recognize justification defenses of self-defense, defense of others,
defense of property, law enforcement, persons with special re-
sponsibility.) Points off for justification defenses defined only in
relation to a specific offense or group of offenses.
FF. If most justification defenses are undefined, maximum of 2.
2. Does the code effectively communicate the law's commands to the
public? _ (0-4)
Scores:
4 = effective communication; 3 = some weakness, but still good com-
munication (MPC rates 3.2); 2 = many problems; 1 = poor communica-
tion; 0 = completely ineffective communication.
Factors:
A. Does the drafting style enhance the code's understandability for a
layperson? Plain words? Short, clear sentences? Section titles
that accurately summarize the section?
B. Does the organization of the code enhance the layperson's under-
standing? Do related sections appear near each other? Do simi-
lar offenses appear next to each other? [Does it contain a table of
contents and an index? Cross-references to related sections?]
BB. If random or alphabetical listing of offenses, maximum of 2.
BBB. If no distinct general part, maximum of 1.
C. Are the code's justification defense rules sufficiently simple that
they reasonably can be remembered and applied in the factual
situations in which they are likely to arise?
D. Does the code have overlapping offenses?
E. Within groups of related offenses, are offenses arranged in order
of seriousness?
F. [How is the criminal code made available to the citizens of the ju-
risdiction? Does the state make any effort to educate its citizens
as to the provisions of the criminal code and what they mean?]
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H. ASSESSING JUST PUNISHMENT FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW'S
COMNIANDS
[Q3 goes to legality interests in the principles of adjudication. The qualities of
comprehensiveness and accessibility are desirable because they increase uniformity
and predictability in application and decrease the potential for abuse. Q4 and Q5 go to
blameworthiness interests.]
3. Does the code provide a comprehensive and accessible statement of
its rules for determining whether to impose liability and, if so, the gen-
eral grade of punishment to be imposed? _ (0-4)
Scores:
4 = fully comprehensive (MPC rates 3.8); 3 = some holes, but generally
comprehensive; 2 = many holes, but more codified than not; 1 = mix of
codified provisions and case law rules; 0 = depends almost entirely on
common law or case law rules.
Factors:
A. Does the code define the terms it uses in its adjudication provi-
sions? Culpability terms? Does it limit the number of culpability
terms that it uses in the definition of offenses? (Does it make
clear the hierarchical order of the culpability levels?)
B. Are all excuse defenses codified? (Most states have disability
excuses of immaturity/infancy, insanity, duress, and involuntary
act, and mistake excuses of mistake as to ajustification ('justified
if believes... "))
Are all nonexculpatory defenses codified? (Most states recognize
nonexculpatory defenses of statute of limitations and entrap-
ment.)
Points off for defenses defined only in relation to a specific of-
fense or group of offenses.
BB. If most excuses and nonexculpatory defenses are undefined,
maximum of 2.
C. Are the code's adjudication rules sufficiently detailed to ensure
uniform application to similar cases (e.g., as in detailed justifica-
tion rules of MPC)?
D. Are the basic adjudication provisions (other than general de-
fenses) fully codified (e.g., provisions governing complicity, cau-
sation, consent, mistake, voluntary intoxication, and limitations
on multiple offenses)?
95:1 (2000)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
4. Does the code accurately assess who does and who does not deserve
criminal liability? _ (0-4)
Scores:
4 = code very accurately assesses criminal liability to those who de-
serve it, and exempts from liability those who do not; 3 = code gener-
ally accurate, but a few problems (MPC rates 3.4); 2 = code has some
problems in accurately assessing liability; 1 code has many serious
problems in accurately assessing liability; 0 = code entirely unreliable
in assessing liability.
Factors:
A. Are there gaps in the code's criminalization scheme such that the
code fails to criminalize conduct that most of the community
would believe sufficiently condemnable to deserve criminal con-
viction (e.g., a general negligent homicide offense)?
B. Does the code criminalize trivial offenses (e.g., cutting in line)?
Does it codify a general defense for a de minimis infraction (e.g.,
MPC § 2.12)? Does the code contain unenforced offenses (e.g.,
adultery, sodomy)?
C. Does the code set proper minimum requirements for criminal li-
ability (e.g., MPC's "substantial step" requirement for attempt
may be too thin a conduct requirement)?
D. Does the code provide a minimum culpability level that is to be
"read in" when an offense definition is silent as to culpability (such
as MPC § 2.02(3))? Does the code provide a presumption against
interpreting a statute as one of strict liability, unless the legislative
intent to impose it is clear? When strict liability is imposed, is the
punishment limited to civil-like penalties, such as a fine?
DD. If code provides negligence as the baseline for offense culpabil-
ity, then maximum of 2.5.
E. Does the code recognize a full set of excuse defenses? (Usually
included are insanity, duress, infancy/immaturity, involuntary act;
excuses sometimes omitted include: involuntary intoxication,
mistake due to reliance upon official misstatement of law, and
mistake due to unavailable law.)
EE. Give extra points for a code that recognizes a general excuse de-
fense for a reasonable mistake of law (e.g., New Jersey § 2C:2-
4(c)(3)).
F. Does the code recognize a full set of justification defenses?
(Usually included are self-defense, defense of others, law en-
forcement authority; justifications sometimes omitted include:
lesser evils/necessity defense.)
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G. How many unjust liability rules does the code contain, and how
central are they in the code's operation (ag., guilty but mentally
ill, unconstrained felony murder)?
5. For those offenders held criminally liable, does the code accurately
assess the proper grade of punishment the offender deserves? (0-4)
Scores:
4 = code very accurately assesses general range (grade) of punishment
deserved; 3 = code generally accurate, but a few problems in assessing
proper grade (MPC rates 2.0); 2 = code has some problems in accu-
rately assessing proper grade; 1 = code has many serious problems in
accurately assessing proper grade; 0 = code entirely unreliable in as-
sessing proper grade.
Factors:
A. Are different grades of an offense based on appropriate factors?
Does the code give proper weight to the grading factors it recog-
nizes?
AA. Is resulting harm taken into account in grading? Or are inchoate
offenses graded the same as completed offenses? If all inchoate
offenses are graded the same as completed offenses, as in MPC §
5.05(1), maximum of 2.
B. Does the code use offense grading categories, rather than pro-
viding a specific sentence for each offense? If so, how many
categories does it have?
BB. If code does not use grading categories, maximum of 2.5.
BBB. If code has at least eight total offense categories (for felonies,
misdemeanor, and violations), then no points off. Add points for
more categories.









I. COMMUNICATING THE LAW'S COMMANDS
1. Does the code contain a comprehensive statement of the law's
commands? (0-4)
Scores:
4 = fully comprehensive (MPC rates 3.8); 3 = some holes, but generally
comprehensive; 2 = many holes, but more codified than not; 1 = mix of
codified provisions and case law references; 0 = depends almost en-
tirely on case law or common law rules.
Factors:
A. Are all criminal offenses defined by the code? If not, how
many are not? Does the code have a provision (like MPC §
1.05(1)) that bars the prosecution of common law offenses or
other offenses not defined by a statute of the state?
[test offenses = murder, assault, theftlarceny/burglary/robbery
offenses, sexual offenses, offenses against family, arson, fraud of-
fenses, inchoate offenses, possession offenses, kidnapping of-
fenses, influence offenses, falsification offenses, obstruction of
government offenses, abuse of office offenses]
6) code contains provision barring prosecution of common law
offenses
5) code contains no provision dealing with whether or not com-
mon law offenses allowed, and all of the offenses we expect to
be in a code (i.e., test offenses) are there
4) code contains no provision dealing with whether or not com-
mon law offenses allowed, and most of the offenses we expect
to be in a code (i.e., test offenses) are there except some of-
fenses we expect to be in a code are missing
3) code contains a provision explicitly allowing prosecution of
common law offenses, but the code also explicitly limits the
punishment for common law crimes or stipulates that only mi-
nor level (e.g., misdemeanor level) common law offenses are
still in effect
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2) code contains provision allowing prosecution of common law
offenses and the code either allows such offenses to be pun-
ished severely, or is silent as to any limit on punishment of
common law offenses
1) most (50% plus) of the offenses we expect to be in a criminal
code are not present in this one (regardless of whether or not
the code contains any provision barring the prosecution of
common law offenses)
AA. If prosecution of uncodified crimes is allowed, maximum al-
lowed score is 2. More points off if uncodified offenses can be
punished seriously (eg., more than a year in prison).
B. Are the terms used in the code of conduct defined in the code?
(Also, but of less importance: are the definitions in a place or
one of a limited number of places such that one could rea-
sonably know where to look for them?)
[check for general definition section; test offenses = homicide,
assault, theft, arson, sexual offenses]
5) code has general definition section, as well as definition sec-
tion for most offenses (e.g., offense v. person)
4) code has general definition section, as well as definition sec-
tion for many offenses (e.g., offense v. person)
3) code contains no general definition section but there are many
offense specific definition sections
2) code contains a general definition section, but either has no of-
fense specific definition sections or paltry few
1) code contains no general definition section, and no definition
section for particular offense sections (or only paltry few at
best)
C. Are offenses defined incompletely, requiring reference to case
law to fully determine the offense's requirements? If so, how
often, and how serious are the offenses?
[test offenses = homicide, assault, theft, burglary, larceny, arson]
4) of our test offenses, most are defined completely by the code
3) of our test offenses, 50% plus are defined completely
2) of our test offenses, less than 50% are defined completely
1) of our test offenses, all are defined incompletely
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D. Are offenses defined by statutes outside the criminal code or
criminal procedure code other than minor regulatory of-
fenses? If so, how many and how serious?
[Some points added back if criminal code contains a cross refer-
ence to these no-criminal-code offenses. Less important than
factors A-C]
3) never (or at least we did not find any) are there offenses de-
fined by statutes outside the criminal code
2) only minor regulatory offenses are defined by statutes outside
the criminal code
1) offenses that should be in the criminal code are defined/found
in statutes outside the criminal code
E. Does the code (a) define the affirmative duties for which a
person may be criminally liable for a failure to perform, or
(b) does it incorporate by reference statutory duties defined
by statutes outside the code, or (c) does it allow liability for
duties imposed by law other than statute (as MPC § 2.01(3)(b)
allows)?
4) the code defines all the affirmative duties for which person
may be liable
3) the code incorporates by reference duties defined by statutes
outside the code (even if a few duties are defined by the code)
2) code makes no mention of affirmative duties (even if a few
duties are defined by the code)
1) code allows liability for duties imposed by law other than stat-
ute (even if a few duties are defined by the code)
EE. For (1), maximum of 3.8
F. Are all justification defenses codified in the code? Points off
for justification defenses defined only in relation to a specific
offense or group of offenses.
[possible justification defenses include self-defense, defense of
others, defense of property, law enforcement, public duty, per-
sons with special responsibility, lesser evils/necessity]
4) all justification defenses we expect in a good criminal code are
defined by this code
3) more than 50% of the justification defenses we expect in a
good criminal code are defined by this code
2) less than 50% of the justification defenses we expect in a good
criminal code are defined by this code
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1) the code contains no justification defenses, or justification de-
fenses are defined only in relation to specific offenses
FF. If most justification defenses are undefined, maximum of 2.
2. Does the code effectively communicate the law's commands to the
public? _ (0-4)
Scores:
4 = effective communication; 3 = some weakness, but still good com-
munication (MPC rates 3.2); 2 = many problems; 1 = poor commnunica-
tion; 0 = completely ineffective communication.
Factors:
A. Does the drafting style enhance the code's understandability
for a layperson? Plain words? Short, clear sentences? Sec-
tion titles that accurately summarize the section?
[test offenses = murder, assault, arson, and theft]
5) universally contains no (or almost no) readability problems-
for our test offenses, the code uses plain words, short/clear
sentences, and section titles accurately summarizing the sec-
tion
4) code sometimes has minor readability problems here and
there-around 50% or so of our test offenses in this code
contain plain words but lengthy/unclear sentences, or complex
words and short/clear sentences, but the other 50% of the test
offenses use plain words/short sentences
3) universally contains minor readability problems-for almost
all test offenses, the code uses plain words but lengthy/unclear
sentences, or complex words and short/clear sentences
2) code sometimes has major readability problems here and
there-50% plus of our test offenses contain lengthy/complex
words/phrases, and lengthy/complex/unclear sentences; the
rest of the test offenses are either OK or are subject to minor
readability problems
1) code universally contains major readability problems-for
almost all test offenses, code uses lengthy/complex
words/phrases, lengthy/complex/unclear sentences, and mis-
leading section titles
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B. Does the organization of the code enhance the layperson's
understanding? Do related sections appear near each other?
Do similar offenses appear next to each other? [Does it con-
tain a table of contents and an index? Cross-references to
related sections?]
6) code contains related sections that appear next to one another,
similar offenses that appear next to each other, and there is a
general part
5) code contains a general part and either related sections appear
next to one another and similar offenses do not, or similar of-
fenses appear next to one another and related sections do not
4) the code contains a random or alphabetical listing of offenses
but it does have a general part
3) the code contains related sections that appear next to one an-
other, similar offenses that appear next to each other, BUT
there is NO general part
2) code contains NO (or paltry) general part and either related
sections appear next to one another and similar offenses do
not, or similar offenses appear next to one another and related
sections do not
1) the code contains a random or alphabetical listing of offenses
and has NO general part
BB. If random or alphabetical listing of offenses, maximum of 2.
BBB. If no distinct general part, maximum of 1.
C. Are the code's justification defense rules sufficiently simple
that they reasonably can be remembered and applied in the
factual situations in which they are likely to arise?
5) justification rules are clear and self contained-the code's
justification rules use plain words and short/clear sentences,
and never require reference to outside provisions
4) rules either have minor readability problems or minor self
containment problems, but not both-the code's justification
rules use plain words and short/clear sentences, and occasion-
ally require reference to outside provisions <or> justification
rules use plain words and lengthy/complex sentences (or com-
plex words and short sentences), and never require reference to
outside provisions, <or> justification rules use plain words and
lengthy/complex sentences (or complex words and short sen-
tences), and occasionally require reference to outside provisions
3) rules have serious readability problems but no self contain-
ment problems-the code's justification rules use complex
Best and Worst American Criminal Codes
words and lengthy sentences, and never require reference to
outside provisions <or> no real readability problems, but
rules have serious self containment problems-i.e., the code's
justification rules use plain words and short/clear sentences,
and almost always require reference to outside provisions
2) justification rules have serious readability problems and self
containmentproblems-the code's justification rules use plain
words and lengthy/complex sentences (or complex words and
short sentences), and almost always require reference to out-
side provisions, <or> justification rules use complex words
and lengthy sentences, and almost always require reference to
outside provisions <or> justification rules use complex words
and lengthy sentences, and occasionally require reference to
outside provisions
1) the code has no justification rules
D. Does the code have overlapping offenses?
[test offenses = murder, assault, theft, sexual assault]
4) no overlapping offenses found for our test offenses
3) some overlapping offenses found for our test offenses
2) a lot of overlapping offenses were found among our test of-
fenses
1) each of our test offense categories contained many overlap-
ping offenses
E. Within groups of related offenses, are offenses arranged in
order of seriousness?
[test offenses = murder, assault, theft, sexual assault]
4) for our test offenses, all offenses within a grouping of offenses
were arranged in order of seriousness (from most serious to
least serious)
3) for our test offenses, most offenses within a grouping of of-
fenses were arranged in order of seriousness (from most seri-
ous to least serious)
2) for our test offenses, many offenses within a grouping of of-
fenses were not arranged in order of seriousness (or were ar-
ranged from least serious to most serious)
1) for our test offenses, many offenses within a grouping of of-
fenses are not arranged in order of seriousness
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[]. ASSESSING JUST PUNISHMENT FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW'S
COMMANDS
[Q3 goes to legality interests in the principles of adjudication. The qualities of
comprehensiveness and accessibility are desirable because they increase uniformity
and predictability in application and decrease the potential for abuse. Q4 and Q5 go
to blameworthiness interests.]
3. Does the code provide a comprehensive and accessible statement of
its rules for determining whether to impose liability and, if so, the gen-
eral grade of punishment to be imposed? _ (0-4)
Scores:
4 = fully comprehensive (MPC rates 3.8); 3 = some holes, but generally
comprehensive; 2 = many holes, but more codified than not; 1 = mix of
codified provisions and case law rules; 0 = depends almost entirely on
common law or case law rules.
Factors:
A. Does the code define the terms it uses in its adjudication pro-
visions? Culpability terms? Does it limit the number of cul-
pability terms that it uses in the definition of offenses? (Does
it make clear the hierarchical order of the culpability levels?)
4) code contains at least 4 (and hopefully not more than 6 or 7)
defined culpability terms, with hierarchy noted (e.g., purpose,
knowing, reckless, negligence)
3) code contains many (5+) culpability terms with no hierarchy
noted
2) code contains only few (1 to 4) defined culpability terms, with
no hierarchy noted
1) code contains no defined culpability terms
B. Are all excuse defenses codified? (Most states have disability
excuses of immaturity/infancy, insanity, duress, and involun-
tary act, and mistake excuses of mistake as to a justification
("justified if believes..."))
Are all nonexculpatory defenses codified? (Most states recognize
nonexculpatory defenses of statute of limitations and entrapment.)
Points off for defenses defined only in relation to a specific of-
fense or group of offenses.
[check for statute of limitation, voluntary act/omission, intoxica-
tion, duress, entrapment, mistaken justification, insanity, imma-
turity, mistake of law excuse]
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4) all excuse defenses we expect to find in a good criminal code
are included/defined by this code
3) more than 50% of the excuse defenses we expect to find in a
good criminal code are included/defined by this code
2) less than 50% of the excuse defenses we expect to find in a
good criminal code are included/defined by this code
1) the code contains no excuse defenses
BB. If most excuses and nonexculpatory defense are uncodified,
maximum of 2.
C. Are the code's adjudication rules sufficiently detailed to en-
sure uniform application to similar cases (eg., as in detailed
justification rules of MPC)?
[check multiple offense limitations, causation, mistake, complic-
ity, intoxication, consent, mental illness negating element, self-
defense, defense of others, defense of property, law enforcement,
public duty, persons with special responsibility, lesser
evils/necessity, voluntary act/omission, intoxication, duress, en-
trapment, mistaken justification, insanity, immaturity, mistake of
law excuse, statute of limitation]
4) for our test list of adjudication rules, all are sufficiently de-
tailed to insure uniform application-i.e., there are no short
blurbs likely requiring case law development
3) for our test list of adjudication rules, more than 50% are suffi-
ciently detailed to insure uniform application-i.e., there are
very few short blurbs likely requiring case law development
2) for our test list of adjudication rules, less than 50% are suffi-
ciently detailed to insure uniform application-i.e., they are all
short blurbs likely requiring case law development, or the code
simply does not contain those provisions
1) for our test list of adjudication rules, none are sufficiently de-
tailed to insure uniform application-i.e., they are all short
blurbs likely requiring case law development, or the code sim-
ply does not contain those provisions (i.e., there are no justifi-
cation/excuse defenses, and culpability terms are ad hoc/made
up on an offense by offense basis)
D. Does the code contain a full set of the provisions (other than
excuses) needed for adjudication of violations?
[check for multiple offense limitation, causation, mistake, com-
plicity, intoxication, consent, mental illness negating element]
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4) code contains all of the general adjudicatory provisions we
expect to find in a good criminal code
3) code contains more than 50% of the general adjudicatory pro-
visions we expect to find in a good criminal code
2) code contains less than 50% of the general adjudicatory provi-
sions we expect to find in a good criminal code
1) code contains none of the general adjudicatory provisions we
expect to find in a good criminal code
E. Does the code contain a section that sets general rules for how
its provisions are to be interpreted?
2) code contains rules by which it is to be interpreted
1) code does not contain rules by which it is to be interpreted
4. Does the code accurately assess who does and who does not deserve
criminal liability? _ (0-4)
Scores:
4 = code very accurately assesses criminal liability to those who de-
serve it, and exempts from liability those who do not; 3 = code gener-
ally accurate, but a few problems (MPC rates 3.4); 2 = code has some
problems in accurately assessing liability; 1 code has many serious
problems in accurately assessing liability; 0 code entirely unreliable
in assessing liability.
Factors:
A. Are there gaps in the code's criminalization scheme such that
code fails to criminalize conduct that most of the community
would believe sufficiently condemnable to deserve criminal
conviction (e.g., a general negligent homicide offense)?
[test offenses = murder, assault, theft/larceny/burglary/robbery
offenses, sexual offenses, offenses against family, arson, fraud of-
fenses, inchoate offenses, possession offenses, kidnapping of-
fenses, influence offenses, falsification offenses, obstruction of
government offenses, abuse of office offenses]
3) no gaps in code's criminalization scheme noted
2) a few gaps in code's criminalization scheme noted
1) many gaps in code's criminalization scheme noted
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B. Does the code criminalize trivial offenses (eg., cutting in
line)? Does it codify a general defense for a de minimis in-
fraction (eg., MPC § 2.12)? Does the code contain unen-
forced offenses (eg., adultery, sodomy)?
[check for de minimis; test offenses = indecency offenses, sex of-
fenses]
5) code contains no trivial/unenforced offenses and a de minimis
defense is included (although not having one shouldn't be a
problem here-note also that this basket is an ideal that likely
no code meets)
4) code contains few trivial/unenforced offenses and a de mini-
mis defense
3) code contains few trivial/unenforced offenses and no de mini-
mis defense
2) code contains many trivial/unenforced offenses and a de
minimis defense
1) code contains many trivial/unenforced offenses and no de
minimis defense
C. Does the code set proper minimum requirements for criminal
liability (e.g., MPC's "substantial step" requirement for at-
tempt may be too thin a conduct requirement)?
[check inchoate offenses]
3) code provides for attempt/conspiracy/inchoate offenses defi-
nition that makes clear that mere preparation is insufficient for
the actus reus element
2) code provides no general definition of attempt/conspiracy/in-
choate offenses
1) code explicitly provides for substantial step (or some equiva-
lent) for attempt/conspiracy/inchoate offenses
D. Does the code provide a minimum culpability level that is to
be "read in" when an offense definition is silent as to culpa-
bility (such as MFC § 2.02(3))? Does the code provide a pre-
sumption against interpreting a statute as one of strict
liability, unless the legislative intent to impose it is clear?
When strict liability is imposed, is the punishment limited to
civil-like penalties, such as a fine?
[check culpability strict liability and provisions]
4) the read-in provision contained in the code is recklessness or
knowledge
3) no read-in provision is contained in the code
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2) the read-in provision contained in the code is explicitly negli-
gence
1) the read-in provision contained in the code is explicitly strictliability
DD. If code allows strict liability to be assumed in absence of
stated culpability term, maximum of 2.5.
E. Does the code recognize a full set of excuse defenses?
[usually included are insanity, duress, infancy/immaturity, invol-
untary act; excuses sometimes omitted include: involuntary in-
toxication, mistake due to reliance upon official misstatement of
law, and mistake due to unavailable law]
4) all excuse defenses we expect to find in a good criminal code
are included/defined by this code
3) more than 50% of the excuse defenses we expect to find in a
good criminal code are included/defined by this code
2) less than 50% of the excuse defenses we expect to find in a
good criminal code are included/defined by this code
1) the code contains no excuse defenses
EE. Give extra points for a code that recognizes a general excuse
defense for a reasonable mistake of law (e.g., New Jersey §
2C:2-4(c)(3)).
F. Does the code recognize a full set of justification defenses?
[usually included are self-defense, defense of others, law en-
forcement authority, defense of property; justifications sometimes
omitted include lesser evils/necessity defense, public duty, spe-
cial responsibility, military orders]
4) all justification defenses we expect in a good criminal code are
defined by this code
3) more than 50% of the justification defenses we expect in a
good criminal code are defined by this code
2) less than 50% of the justification defenses we expect in a good
criminal code are defined by this code
1) the code contains no justification defenses, or justification de-
fenses are defined only in relation to specific offenses
G. How many unjust liability rules does the code contain, and
how central are they in the code's operation (e.g., guilty but
mentally ill, unconstrained felony murder)?
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5) code contains no felony murder rule, and no guilty but men-
tally ill provision
4) code contains constrained felony murder rule, and no guilty
but mentally ill provision
3) code contains unconstrained felony murder rule, and no guilty
but mentally ill provision
2) code contains constrained felony murder rule, BUT has a
guilty but mentally ill provision
1) code contains unconstrained felony murder rule, AND has a
guilty but mentally ill provision
5. For those offenders held criminally liable, does the code accurately
assess the proper grade of punishment the offender deserves? _ (0-4)
Scores:
4 = code very accurately assesses general range (grade) of punishment
deserved; 3 = code generally accurate, but a few problems in assessing
proper grade (MPC rates 2.0); 2 = code has some problems in accu-
rately assessing proper grade; 1 = code has many serious problems in
accurately assessing proper grade; 0 = code entirely unreliable in as-
sessing proper grade.
Factors:
A. Are different grades of an offense based on appropriate fac-
tors? Does the code give proper weight to the grading factors
it recognizes?
[test offenses = assault, arson, and theft. Considerations applied
to test offense of assault are: the harm the assailant inflicted on
the victim, the harm the assailant intended to inflict on the victim,
and any special qualities (such as age or infirmity) of the victim
himself. Considerations for arson are: whether the arsonist has
jeopardized anyone's safety in addition to damaging property,
type of property damaged, value of the property damaged, and
value of the damage to the property. Considerations for theft are
the stolen item's value or its type.]
5) generally recognizes appropriate factors
4) generally recognizes appropriate factors; sometimes applies
factors crudely or uses irrelevant ones
3) frequently applies factors crudely
2) frequently applies factors crudely; sometimes ignores relevant
factors or uses irrelevant ones
1) frequently ignores relevant factors or uses irrelevant ones
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AA. Is resulting harm taken into account in grading? Or are in-
choate offenses graded the same as completed offenses?
[check inchoate offenses, particularly attempt; caveat: conspiracy
often is graded same as substantive offense because group crimi-
nality is seen as an independent harm]
6) specific provision: inchoates lower than complete
5) specific provision: inchoates lower than complete, but with
exceptions
4) no specific provision; apparently few or no inchoates treated
same as complete
3) no specific provision; some or many inchoates treated same
2) specific provision: inchoates = complete, but with exceptions
1) specific provision: inchoates = complete
If all inchoate offenses are graded the same as completed of-
fenses, as in MPC § 5.05(1), maximum of 2.
B. Does the code use offense grading categories, rather than
providing a specific sentence for each offense? If so, how
many categories does it have?
[check for classes of offenses provision]
4) code contains more than 10 grading categories
3) code contains 8-10 grading categories
2) code contains less than 8 grading categories
1) code contains no grading categories-uses specific sentences
for offenses
BB. If code does not use grading categories, maximum of 2.
BBB. If code has at least eight total offense categories (for felonies,
misdemeanor, and violations), then no points off. Add points
for more categories.
C. Are the groups of offenses in the same offense category gen-
erally similar in seriousness?
4) for all grades searched and all the offenses listed, groups of of-
fenses in the same grading category were generally similar in
seriousness
3) underemphasizing seriousness-lower grade (like C, D, E fel-
ony, or misdemeanor) categories contained some offenses suf-
ficiently serious to be in a higher grading category
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2) overemphasizing seriousness-higher grading categories con-
tained some offenses that were not that serious
1) for all grades searched the offenses listed were not generally
similar in seriousness-failings include both overemphasizing
and underemphasizing seriousness-higher grading categories
contained some offenses that were not that serious, and lower
grade (like C, D, E felony, or misdemeanor) categories con-
tained some offenses sufficiently serious to be in a higher
grading category
TOTAL SCORE_ (0-20)
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APPENDIX C
SUMMARY OF SCORING DOCUMENTATION, BY STATE
QUESTION STATES
/FACTOR
FED A I AL AR AZ CA CO CT DC
1/A 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 2
I/B 1 2 4 2 4 2 4 4 1
I/C 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2
1/D 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
I/E 2 2 3 1 3 2 1 2 2
I/F 1 4 3 3 3 1 4 3 1
Q1 Score 1.55 3.55 3.55 3.4 3.55 1.1 3.55 2.4 0.4
2/A 4 4 4 4 4 2 5 3 3
2/B 1 6 6 5 5 2 6 5 1
2/C 1 4 4 4 4 4 5 2 1
2/D 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3
2/E 1 3 3 3 1 2 3 3 2
Q2 Score 0.6 3.3 3.3 3.2 3 0.6 3.55 2.1 0.6
3/A 1 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 1
3/B 2 3 3 4 4 2 4 3 1
3/C 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
3/D 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 2
3/E 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1
Q3 Score 0.8 3.4 3.55 3.55 3.55 1.5 3.7 3.4 0.5
4/A 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
4/B 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 1 1
4/C 2 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 2
4/D 3 4 3 4 3 2 3 3 3
4/E 2 3 3 4 4 2 4 3 1
4/F 1 4 3 3 3 1 4 4 1
4/G 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 3
Q4 Score 0.2 3.35 2.25 3.15 2.7 0.45 2.8 2.3 0
5/A 2 3 2 4 4 1 3 3 1
5/AA 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 2 5
5/B 1 2 2 3 3 1 4 3 I
5/C 2 4 4 4 4 3 4 1 2
Q5 Score 1.2 2.9 2.7 3.5 3.5 1.5 3.4 1.9 1.2
TOTAL 4.35 16.5 15.3 16.8 16.3 5.15 17 12.1 2.7
SCORE
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QUESTION STATES
/FACTOR
DE FL GA HI A ID IL IN IKS
I/A 6 3 6 6 6 2 6 6 6
1/B 2 1 2 4 2 2 2 2 2
1/C 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 2
1/D 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
1/E 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 3 1
1/F 4 2 3 4 3 1 3 3 3
Q1 Score 3.65 0.55 3.1 3.55 3.3 0.6 3 3.35 3
2/A 3 2 3 4 4 2 4 4 4
2/B 5 1 6 6 5 1 5 5 5
2/C 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4
2/D 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2/E 2 2 2 4 3 2 2 i 1
Q2 Score 2.9 0.8 3.1 3.3 3.2 0.8 3.1 3 3
3/A 4 1 1 4 2 4 4 2 2
3/B 3 1 3 4 3 2 3 4 3
3/C 3 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 3
3D 3 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 2
3/E 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2
Q3 Score 3.55 0.5 2.4 3.7 2.4 2.4 3.4 2.8 2.4
4/A 3 2 3 3 3 1 3 3 3
4/B 3 3 3 4 3 3 1 3 3
4/C 1 I 1 1 2 2 1 1 1
4/1D 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 4
4/E 3 1 3 4 3 2 3 4 3
4/F 4 2 3 4 3 1 3 3 3
4/G 3 4 3 5 4 4 4 2 4
Q4 Score 3.15 0.5 2.15 3.8 2.5 0.35 2.95 2.65 3.15
5/A 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4
5/AA 1 5 5 1 3 6 5 2 6
5/1B 3 2 1 2 2 1 3 3 4
5/C 3 4 1 4 4 1 2 1 3
Q5 Score 1.9 2.6 1.2 1.9 1.7 1.6 2.8 1.5 3.4
TOTAL 15.15 4.95 11.95 16.25 13.1 5.75 15.25 13.3 14.95
SCORE
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QUESTION STATES
/FACTOR
KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS
I/A 6 6 5 5 6 2 6 6 5
1/B 4 2 1 1 4 1 4 2 1
I/C 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 2
1/D 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3
1/E 3 2 2 2 1 1 3 2 2
I/F 4 3 1 1 4 1 3 4 1
Q1 Score 3.7 3.3 0.55 0.55 3 0.45 3.55 3.5 0.55
2/A 4 3 1 4 4 3 4 4 1
2/B 5 6 1 1 5 1 5 5 1
2/C 4 4 1 1 4 1 4 4 1
2/D 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 2
2/E 3 2 1 2 2 3 4 3 1
Q2 Score 2.9 3.1 0.2 0.45 3.1 0.45 3.3 3.2 0.2
3/A 4 2 1 1 4 1 2 4 1
3/B 3 3 1 1 3 1 2 4 1
3/C 3 3 1 1 3 1 3 3 1
3/D 2 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 1
3/E 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
Q3 Score 3.4 2.8 0 0 3.4 0.5 2.4 3.4 0
4/A 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3
4/B 3 3 1 3 4 1 3 3 1
4/C 1 3 1 2 1 1 3 3 3
4/D 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3
4/E 3 3 1 1 3 1 2 4 1
4/F 4 3 1 1 4 1 3 4 1
4/G 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3
Q4 Score 2.75 2.5 0.05 0.15 2.7 0.05 1.8 3.5 0.15
5/A 3 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 1
5/AA 6 6 5 3 5 5 6 6 1
5/B 3 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 1
5/C 4 1 1 1 4 1 3 4 1
Q5 Score 3.1 1.3 1.1 0.6 2.7 1.1 2.4 2.7 0.5
TOTAL 15.85 13 1.9 1.75 14.85 2.55 13.45 16.3 1.4
SCORE
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QUESTION STATES
IFAcTOR
MT [ NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY
1/A 6 5 6 3 6 6 2 6 5
1/B 2 1 2 1 2 4 2 4 2
1/C 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 3
1/D 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
1/E 1 2 1 2 3 3 1 2 2
1/F 3 1 3 4 4 4 1 1 3
Q1 Score 3.35 0.4 3.4 1 3.65 3.75 0.6 1.25 2.3
2/A 4 3 4 3 4 3 2 3 4
2/B 5 2 5 5 6 6 4 5 6
2/C 4 1 4 3 4 3 1 4 3
2/D 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2/E 1 3 3 2 3 3 2 1 2
Q2 Score 3 0.55 3.2 1.3 3.3 3.1 0.9 2.9 3.2
3/A 2 1 4 2 1 4 1 2 4
3/B 3 1 4 1 3 4 1 2 4
3/C 3 1 3 1 3 3 1 3 3
3/D 3 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 2
3/E 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2
Q3 Score 3 0.5 3.7 0.8 1.5 3.7 0.8 3 3.55
4/A 3 3 3 2 3 3 1 3 3
4/B 3 1 3 3 3 4 3 3 3
4/C 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 3
4/D 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 3
4/E 3 1 4 1 3 4 1 2 4
4/F 3 1 3 4 4 4 1 3 3
4/G 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Q4 Score 235 0.05 3.35 0.8 2.65 3.8 0.15 2 2.8
5/A 2 1 2 4 2 2 4 3 4
5/AA 1 6 2 6 2 2 4 5 5
5/B 1 4 2 4 2 2 2 2 3
5/C 2 3 3 4 2 4 4 1 3
Q5 Score 0.9 2.4 2 3.4 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.3 3.3
TOTAL 12.6 3.9 15.65 7.3 12.4 16.05 4.65 11.45 15.15
SCORE
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QUESTION STATES
/FACTOR
OH OK OR I PA RI SC SD TN TX
I/A 6 6 5 6 2 5 6 6 6
l/B 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 4
1/C 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3
1/D 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2
I/E 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 2 2
1/F 1 1 3 4 1 1 2 3 4
QI Score 1.15 1.25 1.7 3.45 0.4 0.55 1.3 2.95 3.25
2/A 3 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 4
2/B 5 4 6 6 1 1 5 6 6
2/C 1 3 4 3 1 1 4 4 4
2/D 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 4
2/E 3 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
Q2 Score 2.6 0.8 3.25 3.1 0.5 0.6 2.9 3.25 3.3
3/A 4 4 4 4 1 1 4 4 4
3/B 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 4
3/C 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 3
3/D 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 2
3/E I I 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
Q3 Score 1.5 3 3.4 3.4 0 0 3.2 3.4 3.55
4/A 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3
4/B 3 1 3 4 1 3 3 3 3
4/C 3 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 3
4/D 4 3 2 4 3 3 3 4 4
4/E 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 4
4/F 1 1 3 4 1 1 2 3 4
4/G 4 3 2 3 4 4 3 4 4
Q4 Score 0.6 0.55 2.35 3.15 0.05 0.1 1.7 3.35 3.8
5/A 3 I 3 2 1 2 3 2 5
5/AA 6 6 6 1 4 1 6 5 6
5/B 3 I 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
5/C 4 1 4 4 1 1 3 4 2
Q5 Score 2.95 1.3 2.9 1.5 0.8 1.2 3.1 3.1 3.35
TOTAL 8.8 6.9 13.6 14.6 1.75 2.45 12.2 16.05 17.25
SCORE
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QUESTION STATES
/FACTOR
UT [ VA VT WA WI WV WY MPC
I/A 6 2 5 2 6 2 6 6
1/B 4 2 1 2 2 1 2 4
1/C 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 3
I/D 2 3 3 1 3 1 3 3
1/E 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
1/F 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 4
Q1 Score 3.2 0.5 0.55 0.7 3.3 0.3 1.15 3.65
2/A 3 4 4 4 4 1 4 5
2/B 6 5 1 4 5 1 6 6
2/C 3 1 1 4 4 1 1 3
2/D 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3
2/E 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 4
Q2 Score 3 2.7 0.5 1.2 3 0.4 3 3.2
3/A 4 1 1 4 4 1 2 4
3/B 4 1 1 3 2 1 1 4
3/C 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 4
3/D 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 4
3/E 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Q3 Score 3.55 0.5 0.5 3 2.8 0 0.8 4
4/A 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 3
4/B 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 4
4/C 1 2 1 1 3 2 3 1
4/D 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4
4/E 4 1 1 3 2 1 1 4
4/F 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 4
4/G 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4
Q4 Score 3.35 0.1 0.15 2.15 2 0.05 0.35 3.7
5/A 4 1 1 2 4 2 2 3
5/AA 5 5 5 6 5 6 2 2
5/B 3 4 1 2 3 1 1 2
5/C 3 1 2 4 3 1 4 4
Q5 Score 3.2 2.4 1.1 2.3 3 0.8 1.2 2
TOTAL 16.3 6.2 2.8 9.35 14.1 1.55 6.5 16.55
SCORE
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